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"We,

the Paparazzi": Developing a Privacy
Paradigm for Digital Video
JacquelineD. Lipton*

ABSTRACT: Current digital-privacy regulation focuses predominantly on
text records that contain personal data. Little attention has been paid to
privacy in video files that may portray individuals in inappropriatecontexts
or in an unflattering or embarrassinglight. As digital video technology,
including inexpensive cell-phone cameras, becomes widespread in the hands
of the public, the regulatoryfocus must shift. At one time a small percentage
of online content, digital video is now appearingat an exponential rate.
This is largely due to the growth of online social-networkingplatforms, such
as YouTube and Facebook. Sharing video online has become a global
phenomenon, while the lack of effective privacy protection for these images
has become a global problem. Digital video poses four distinct problems for
privacy, arisingfrom: decontextualization,dissemination, aggregation,and
permanency of video information. While video shares some of these attributes
with text, video's unique qualities necessitate separate study. This Article
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identifies a rationalefor, and critiques suggested approaches to, digitalvideo privacy. It argues that legal regulation, without more, is unlikely to
provide appropriatesolutions. Instead, it advocatesfor a new multimodal
approach, consisting of a matrix of legal rules, social norms, system
architecture,marketforces, public education, and nonprofit institutions.
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"WE, THE PAPARAZZI"
I.

INTRODUCTION

In my mind and in my car, we'can't rewind we've gone too far.
Pictures came and broke your heart,put the blame on VTR
-The

Buggies, Video Killed the Radio Star1

Are we all paparazzi now? Consider the story of "dog-poop girl." Once
upon a time, a passenger's dog defecated on the floor of a subway car in
South Korea. While unremarkable in itself, this story quickly became an
Internet sensation when the passenger refused to clean the mess. 2 Someone
on the train, an anonymous face in the crowd, took photos of the woman
with a cell-phone camera. These images were promptly posted on a popular
Korean blog. The aim was to shame the unrepentant and socially
irresponsible dog owner. 3 Ultimately, the humiliation attached to this
incident resulted in a "firestorm of criticism" that caused her to quit her
job.4 This story is one of a number of recent episodes illustrating how a
person's privacy can be destroyed at the push of a button, using the simplest
and most ubiquitous combination of digital technologies-the cell-phone
camera and the Internet. 5 While some may say that dog-poop girl received
her just deserts for being a socially irresponsible dog owner, others may well
feel that the punishment far outweighed the crime.
Then there's the story of "Star Wars kid"-a Canadian teenager who
filmed himself playing with a golf-ball retriever as if it were a light-saber from
the Star Wars movies. Embarrassing? Yes. Socially irresponsible? No. His
video was posted to the Internet without his authorization. A variety of
6
amateur video enthusiasts then adopted it on services such as YouTube.
7
They created many popular, but extremely humiliating, mash-up videos of
1.

THE BUGGLES, Video Killed the Radio Star, on THE AGE OF PLASTIC (Island Records 1979).

2.

JONATHAN ZITrRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND HOW TO STOP IT 211

(2008).
3. See DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET 1-2 (2007) (noting that websites and newspapers around the world quickly picked up
the story, resulting in the "public shaming and embarrassment" of the dog owner).
4.
ZirrRAIN, supra note 2, at 211.
5. See id. at 99 ("One holder of a mobile phone camera can irrevocably compromise
someone else's privacy .... ."). On camera phones in particular, see discussion in Alan Kato Ku,
Comment, Talk Is Cheap, but a Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words: Privacy Rights in the Era of
CameraPhone Technology, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 679 (2005).
6. See, e.g., YouTube Video: Star Wars Kid Drunken Jedi (fantom8lz28 2006), http://

www.youtube.com/watch?v-3GJOVPjhXMY (displaying an example of one of the many "Star
Wars kid remixes" available on YouTube).
7. See JANET LOWE, GOOGLE SPEAKS: SECRETS OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST BILLIONAIRE
ENTREPRENEURS, SERGEY BRIN AND LARRY PAGE 290 (2009) (defining "mashup" as "[a] digital
media file containing a mix of text, audio, and animation; it recombines and tweaks each work
to create a derivative work. Mashup music and videos, for example, are a collage of other

works").
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the youth. 8 The young man ended up dropping out of school. He also
required psychiatric care, including a period of institutionalization at a
children's psychiatric facility. 9 Even more worrying perhaps was the fate of
"Bus Uncle" in Hong Kong. This man was physically assaulted in a targeted
attack at the restaurant where he worked. The attack ensued after an online
posting of a video depicting him speaking loudly on his cellphone on a bus
and ignoring requests of other passengers to be quiet. 10
11
We are witnessing the emergence of a worrying new trend: peers
intruding into each other's privacy and anonymity with video and
multimedia files in ways that harm the subjects of these digital files. 12 There
is a mismatch between these harms and the legal remedies available, notably
those arising out of privacy and defamation law. 13 Even new laws such as the

8. See SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 44-48 (discussing the Star Wars kid example of a videobased privacy invasion that harmed an individual's reputation and caused ongoing harm to him
in the real world); ZITrRAIN, supra note 2, at 211-12 (discussing the Star Wars kid scenario).
9. ZITrRAIN, supra note 2, at 212 ("The student who made the [Star Wars kid] video has
been reported to have been traumatized by its circulation .... "); Star Wars Kid Files Lawsuit,
WIRED,
July 24,
2003,
http://wwwwired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2003/07/59757
("Chyslain [Raza] was so teased about the video, he dropped out of school and finished the
semester at a children's psychiatric ward, according to a lawsuit filed in the Raza's hometown of
Trois-Rivirres, Quebec.").
10. ZInTRAIN, supra note 2, at 211. Zittrain describes the Bus Uncle story:
The famed "Bus Uncle" of Hong Kong upbraided a fellow bus passenger who
politely asked him to speak more quietly on his mobile phone. The mobile phone
user learned an important lesson in etiquette when a third person captured the
argument and then uploaded it to the Internet, where 1.3 million people have
viewed one version of the exchange .... Weeks after the video was posted, the Bus
Uncle was beaten up in a targeted attack at the restaurant where he worked.
Id.
11. In this context I use the term "peers" in a broad sense, referring to members of society
with equal access to each other via cell-phone pictures and day-to-day interactions. Unless the
context otherwise requires, the term is not intended to connote particularly close personal
relationships.
12.

See ZrrTRAIN, supra note 2, at 221. Zittrain explains:

The central problem [for regulating privacy on the Internet] is that the
organizations creating, maintaining, using, and disseminating records of
identifiable personal data are no longer just "organizations"-they are people who
take pictures and stream them online, who blog about their reactions to a lecture
or a class or a meal, and who share on social sites rich descriptions of their friends
and interactions.
Id.; see also Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through
Implied Contractsof Confidentiality,74 U. CIN. L. REv. 887, 927 (2006) ("[T]echnology has made it
much easier for people to take embarrassing pictures of others, both with and without consent,
and to widely disseminate them via the Internet."); id. at 928 ("Digital cameras and camcorders
are specifically designed to be connected to computers and to deliver pictures across worldwide
networks in an instant.").
13. Existing privacy torts generally do not extend to activities in public places, even where
one would assume the video subject had some expectation of privacy or anonymity. See infra

"WE, THE PAPARAZZI"
proposed Camera Phone Predator Alert Bill1 4 would only notify a person
that a picture of her may have been taken. It would do nothing to stem the
15
tide of global online dissemination of a damaging image of that person.
While it is now trite to say that the Internet poses significant risks to privacy,
these risks have previously manifested themselves in the collection, use, and
17
16
dissemination of text-based personal records by governments, businesses,
health-care providers,' 8 Internet intermediaries, 19 and prospective
employers. 20 Today, we need to add concerns about unauthorized uses,
often in video formats, 21 of our personal information by our peers over
Part II.A.2 (discussing the law's inability to resolve image subjects' concerns with online
dissemination). Defamation law will not sanction the publication of truthful material. A
"defamatory" statement is a false statement that potentially harms a person's reputation. Arlen
Langvardt, Section 43(a), CommercialFalsehood, and the First Amendment: A Proposed Framework, 78
MINN. L. REv. 309, 334 (1993) ("The common law defines defamation as the publication of a
false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff. Defamatory statements, by definition, tend
to harm the plaintiff's reputation.").
14. Camera Phone Predator Alert Act, H.R. 414, l11th Cong. § 3(a) (1st Sess. 2009)
(requiring camera phones to emit a sound whenever a photograph is taken).
15. See Campbell v. MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, 491 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.) (noting that the dissemination of legally taken photographs can do more damage
than the taking of the photographs themselves).
16. Professor Solove has, in fact, devoted a large part of a book to these issues. DANIEL
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 165-222 (2004) (exploring government access to private
information).
17. As Professor Solove described:
Computers enable marketers to collect detailed dossiers of personal information
and to analyze it to predict the consumer's behavior. Through various analytic
techniques, marketers construct models of what products particular customers will
desire and how to encourage customers to consume. Companies know how we
spend our money, what we do for a living, how much we earn, and where we live.
They know about our ethnic backgrounds, religion, political views, and health
problems. Not only do companies know what we have already purchased, but they
also have a good idea about what books we will soon buy or what movies we will
want to see.
Id. at 4.
18. See, e.g.,
Patricia Sanchez Abril & Anita Cava, Health Privacy in a Techno-Social World: A
Cyber-Patient'sBill of Rights, 6 Nw.J. TECH. INTELL. PROP. 244, 1 4 (2008) (describing threats to
personal health information); Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and
Cyberspace: Protectingthe Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 332-33
(2007) (same).
19. See,
e.g.,
Electronic
Privacy
Information
Center,
Privacy?
Proposed
Google/DoubleClick Merger, http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2010)
(expressing concern about the ability of Internet intermediaries such as Google, a searchengine company, and DoubleClick, an Internet advertising firm, to monitor users' online
behavior in the context of proposed merger negotiations between Google and DoubleClick).
20. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 203 (discussing employers' practices with respect to
ascertaining and using online information about prospective hires).
21. Throughout this Article, "video" refers collectively to still images and multimedia
video files. While I recognize there are important qualitative differences between these kinds of
files, the aim of this Article is to draw a line between text-based privacy incursions and those
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networks such as MySpace, 2 2 Facebook, 23 Flickr,24 and YouTube. 25 An image
of an individual in an embarrassing situation might well affect her chances
of employment, 26 education, or health insurance. 27 As the examples of Star
Wars kid, dog-poop girl, and Bus Uncle demonstrate, the consequences of
such unauthorized dissemination can be devastating.
Video images are qualitatively different from text-based data in a variety
of ways. 28 Nevertheless, most privacy literature fails to acknowledge that fact.

incursions that involve different kinds of media. In later work, I hope to draw more subtle
distinctions between different non-text formats for online information. See ZIrTRAIN, supranote
2, at 221 (noting that new threats to privacy arise from the dissemination of peer-based
multimedia content on the Internet, as opposed to the traditional threats where organizations
collated text-based data about private individuals).
22. MySpace is a social-networking service where individuals can search for and
communicate with old and new friends. MySpace Press Room, Fact Sheet, http://www.myspace.
com/pressroom?url=/fact+sheet/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
23. Facebook describes itself as a "social utility that connects you with the people around
you." Facebook, Press Room: About Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/press.php (last
visited Feb. 17, 2010).
24. Flickr describes itself as "almost certainly the best online photo management and
sharing application in the world." Flickr, About Flickr, http://www.flickr.com/about/ (last
visited Feb. 17, 2010).
25. YouTube is an online file-sharing service for video files. YouTube, YouTube Fact Sheet,
http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet (last visited Feb. 18, 2010); see also SOLOVE, supra note 3,
at 40 ("Anybody can post videos of anybody else on YouTube. People can post pictures of you or
write about you in their blogs. Even if you aren't exhibiting your private life online, it may still
wind up being exposed by somebody else.").
26. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 38 ("Employers are looking at social network site profiles of
prospective employees. Microsoft officials admit to trolling the Internet for anything they can
find out about people they are considering for positions.").
27. Id. On the other hand, there is some suggestion that the widespread availability of
personal information online cannot be stopped and might actually be beneficial to society. See,
e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information,
102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1667, 1736-37 (2008) (arguing that basing decisions on real information
rather than dangerous and discriminatory proxies such as race actually provides social benefits
overall).
28. Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [2008] E.M.L.R. 20,
[16]-[23] (Eng.) (noting qualitative difference between video and text information in the
privacy context); Campbell v. MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, 501 (appeal taken
from Eng.) (U.K.) (noting qualitatively greater privacy harm that could occur as a result of
dissemination of video images as compared with a textual account of the information in the
journalist's story); JON MILLS, PRIVAcY THE LOST RIGHT 35-37 (2008) (noting the importance
of recognizing that information available through different modes of communication--such as
text, audio tape, still images, and video recordings-have different impacts on privacy); id. at
238 ("[C]ourts may be more inclined to protect against intrusive images than intrusive words.");
id. at 262-63 (describing British courts' readiness to extend privacy protections to photographs,
but not to textual descriptions of particular misconduct); JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN
DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 43 (2008) ("Photographs

are no longer just tangible items to be mailed to friends and family-they are computer bytes
easily spread across the Internet. These friends, too, upload the pictures to their own photosharing sites . . . ."); see also infra Part II (discussing the difference between video images and
text-based data in terms of gaps in the legal framework).

"WE, THE PAPARAZZI"

This Article focuses on how to protect video privacy in an age of online
social networking. 29 This issue must be considered urgently by law- and
policy-makers to avoid the entrenchment of privacy-destroying norms when
online social-networking technologies ("OSNs") reach a critical-mass
point.30 This Article argues that legal regulation alone is unlikely to solve
society's video-privacy problems.3 1 It advocates a multimodal approach 3 2 that
combines six regulatory modalities: legal rules, social norms,3 3 system
architecture, 34 market forces, 35 public education, and private nonprofit
institutions. 36 Part II identifies gaps in privacy law with respect to onlinevideo privacy. It notes that current tort laws are ill-suited to the digital age
and are globally disharmonized. Part III identifies practical and theoretical
justifications for, and possible approaches to, regulating online-video
privacy. Part IV sets out a framework for a new multimodal regulatory
approach based on the six modalities identified above. Part V concludes with
a discussion of future directions for online-video-privacy regulation.

29. LOWE, supra note 7, at 292 (defining "social networking" as "[w]ebsites that allow
people to share ideas, information, and images and to form networks with friends, family, or
other like-minded individuals").
30. That is, of course, assuming they haven't already reached that point. See generally Gaia
Bernstein, Wien New Technologies Are Still New: Windows of Opportunity for Privacy Protection, 51
VILL. L. REV. 921 (2006) (noting importance of at least thinking about making regulatory
decisions to protect privacy interests before privacy-destroying norms become entrenched when
the take-up of the technology reaches a critical mass).
31.
JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 181 (2006) ("There's no reason to doubt that most people's lives are
dominated not by law but by social norms, morality, and the market, or that the Internet is

deeply influenced by its code.").
32. Other commentators have noted the importance of taking a multimodal approach to
protecting privacy rights online generally. See, e.g., PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 28, at 69 ("Any
solution to the problem of privacy is going to require the involvement of multiple actors.").
33.

Katherine J. Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation: A Theory of Willpower

Norms, 57 RUTGERS L. REv. 1235, 1238 (2005). Strandburg stated:
Social norms are primarily understood as means to coordinate the behavior of
individuals in a social group. Thus, norms may help to solve coordination
problems-by determining how pedestrians pass one another on the street-and
collective action problems-by stigmatizing littering-when individually rational
behavior leads to collectively undesirable results.
Id.
34. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 556-68 (1998) (describing how digital technology can
be utilized as a form of regulatory mechanism for online conduct).
35. Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1253 (2001) ("Markets constrain
behavior through price. If the price of gasoline rises dramatically, people will drive less.").
36. These may be defined as institutions with social benefits, rather than commercial
profits, as their aim. See Neil M. Richards, IntellectualPrivacy, 87 TEX. L. REv 387, 419-21 (2008)
(describing the American Libraries Association as a regulatory institution in this sense with
respect to the bill of rights it developed to protect interests of library patrons in 1939).
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ONLINE-VIDEO PRIVACY: GAPS IN THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK

New technologies are radically advancing our freedoms, but they are also
enabling unparalleledinvasions of privacy.
-Electronic

Frontier Foundation

37

Advances in video technologies-with respect to both still and moving
images-have historically facilitated dramatic social transformations. In the
late nineteenth century, when photography first became relatively cheap
and portable,3 8 commentators expressed concerns about the development

of the "snap camera" by Kodak. 39 This camera, for the first time, enabled
private individuals and members of the press to take and distribute candid

photographs in a way never before possible. 40 It also spurred Warren and
Brandeis to publish their seminal article on privacy. 41 Their article shaped
the development of American privacy law for more than a century. 42 The
fact that the article derived from the authors' concerns about video privacy
suggests something important about video that differentiates it from other
43
forms of information.

37. Electronic Frontier
visited Feb. 18, 2010).

Foundation,

Privacy,

http://www.eff.org/issues/privacy

(last

38. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 107 ("Kodak's snap camera was cheap and portable. Many
more people could afford to own their own camera, and for the first time, candid photos of
people could be taken.").
39. Id. at 107-08.
40. DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 15 (2008) ("Warren and Brandeis were
concerned not only with new [photographic] technology but with how it would intersect with
the media. The press was highly sensationalistic at the time."); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality,96 GEO.L.J. 123, 128-29 (2007)
(describing Warren and Brandeis' concern with the combination of newspaper sensationalism
and new photographic technology enabling more widescale candid photography and
dissemination of resulting photographs than ever before).
41.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890); see also MILLS, supra note 28, at 5 (noting that concerns about the advent of popular
photography were probably what spurred Warren and Brandeis to write the article); SOLOVE,
supra note 3, at 109 ("Warren and Brandeis were concerned about the sensationalistic press and
new technologies such as the snap camera.").
42. SOLOVE, supra note 40, at 15 ("Many scholars have proclaimed Warren and Brandeis's
article the foundation of privacy law in the United States."); Richards & Solove, supra note 40, at
128 (describing Warren and Brandeis's contribution to the privacy debate as "Privacy's Defining
Moment in the heading for Part I").
43. See Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [2008] E.M.L.R.
20, [16]-[23] (Eng.) (noting the qualitative difference between video and text information in
the privacy context); Campbell v. MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, 501 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (noting qualitatively that greater privacy harm could occur as a result
of dissemination of video images as compared with a textual account of the information in a
journalist's story); MILLS, supra note 28, at 35-37 (noting the importance of recognizing that
information available through different modes of communication-such as text, audio tape,
still images, and video recordings-have different impacts on privacy); id. at 238 ("[C]ourts may
be more inclined to protect against intrusive images than intrusive words."); id. at 263

"WE, THE PAPARAZZI"

Today's online-video technologies create new threats to privacy. The
ready accessibility of cell-phone cameras and small, easily concealed video
cameras, 44 coupled with the Internet, makes the dissemination of videoboth still and multimedia-practically instantaneous and potentially global
in scope. The concerns about losing control over personal information
online are much greater today than they were, even in the gossip rags of the
nineteenth century. To be published in a newspaper, albeit a scandal sheet,
pictures had to make their way into the hands of an entity that produced
such a publication. Most such publications, at least in theory, are also
generally subject to some ethical codes of conduct. 45 Today, anyone can be a
publisher. Photographers do not even need a stand-alone camera to capture
a candid image-most people can resort to their inexpensive and everpresent cellphones. 46 The fact that individuals can instantly snap a
photograph without even thinking to carry a camera, and can then
disseminate that image instantaneously and globally at the push of a button,
raises significant problems of decontextualization. Comparing a video-based
account of an event to a text-based account reveals that the textual account
likely provides more relevant and accurate context. The video-based account
may capture more information in terms of small background details, but
those details will not necessarily provide the more accurate context conveyed
by textual accounts. Some courts have begun to recognize the distinction
between information in text and video formats in terms of concerns about
47
contextualization.
Another significant difference between video and text records is that
textual data is often iterative. It is usually aggregated over a period of time
from different sources which provide both improved contextual information
and a greater degree of accuracy. Concerns about digital data have generally
focused on the way in which textual data can represent too detailed a profile

(describing British courts' readiness to extend privacy protections to photographs, but not to
textual descriptions of particular misconduct).
Mosley, [2008] E.M.L.R. 20, [1]-[5] (describing facts in which a journalist paid a sex
44.
worker to hide a video camera in her clothing while engaging in paid sexual acts with the

plaintiff).
45. See, e.g., Campbell, [2004] 2 A.C. at 502 (discussing the Press Complaints Commission
Code of Practice in the United Kingdom).
46.

See Ku, supra note 5, at 679 (discussing camera phones' "rapidly increasing" popularity

in the United States and their increasing presence in the cellular-phone market).
47. In Campbell v. MGNLtd, for example, a majority of the House of Lords in Britain took
the view that the addition of a photograph to a news story about supermodel Naomi Campbell's
drug addiction potentially confused readers as to details in the story and that the story was more
accurate without the photographs. Campbell, [2004] 2 A.C. at 504. But the decision was not
unanimous. Id. at 492 ("The argument that the publication of the photograph added credibility
to the story has little weight. The photograph was not self-explanatory. Neither the place nor
the person were instantly recognisable. The reader only had the editor's word as to the truth of
these details.").
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of a person online that is often readily available to third parties. 48 An
aggregated text profile, for example, may include items that suggest a
person is trying to become pregnant. These data may include records
involving purchase of ovulation tests, pregnancy tests, information on
pregnancy, information on in vitro fertilization ("IVF"), and medical
appointments with fertility specialists. It may take a whole collection of
textual data, like that above, to suggest something that a picture candidly
demonstrates in one digital file. A video image of the person entering an
IVF clinic, for example, may tell the story in one glance.
Nevertheless, the image can lack context. 49 For example, the video
subject may have entered the IVF clinic for a variety of reasons, including to
provide support to a friend undergoing IVF treatment. Thus, the aggregated
text profile more accurately reflects a data subject's attempts to become
pregnant because it is verifiable by a set of data collected over time from a
variety of sources. Of course, it is equally possible that the data subject could
be purchasing tests and fertility information for a friend just as easily as she
could be attending an IVF clinic to provide support to a friend.
Nevertheless, in general, the aggregation of multiple data records across
time and from a variety of sources is less likely to be misinterpreted than a
single image taken out of context. The more sources and the more time
involved, the more accurate the data record is likely to be.
Data in video formats is also problematic vis-4-vis aggregated text
records because the video data tends to be more accessible to more people
than the text records. Aggregated text-based databases usually reside on
servers owned by corporations and government authorities. These records
do not usually find their way onto the open Web or OSNs like Facebook and
MySpace, at least not in the absence of major security breaches involving the
original database holders. In sum, digital video-whether in still format or
multimedia format-raises a number of significant privacy problems. The
problems include: ease of access; lack of context; the threat of viral
dissemination; 50 the possibility of aggregating video with additional
48.
49.

See SOLOVE, supranote 40, at 118 (describing the problem of "aggregation").
See Patricia Sinchez Abril, A (My)Space of One's Own: On Privacy and Online Social

Networks, 6 Nw. J. TEcH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 75 (2007) (raising contextualization concerns

about images disseminated online).
50. With respect to the viral distribution of information online generally, see SOLOVE,
supranote 3, at 62. Solove stated:
In the offline world, rarely does gossip hit a tipping point. The process of
spreading information to new people takes time, and friends often associate in
similar circles, so most secrets don't spread too widely. The Internet takes this
phenomenon and puts it on steroids. People can communicate with tens of
thousands-even millions-of people almost simultaneously. If you put something
up on the Internet, countless people can access it at the same time. In an instant,
information can speed across the globe.
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information that may51 or may not be accurate; 52 and the inability of an
image subject to obtain effective control of the information once it hits
cyberspace. 53 These problems are highlighted below in an examination of
gaps in the current laws that protect privacy.
A.

PROTECTING ONLINE PRIVACY: GAPs IN THE LAW

1.

Copyright Law

While copyright law has proven extremely effective in protecting
property rights online, it is of little assistance to those seeking to protect
privacy. Copyright in an image is generally granted to the photographer, not
the photographic subject. 54 Since the subject is not likely to have been the

photographer, copyright law will not help those attempting to control
dissemination of photographs in which they feature as subjects. Of course, in
the unusual case where the subject is the copyright owner, 55 a copyright

51.
See supra Part I (discussing cases in which the information was accurate, but was
nonetheless damaging).
52. The idea of data aggregation appears as a subset of the idea of information processing
in Professor Solove's "taxonomy of privacy." See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 40, at 118
("Aggregation is the gathering of information about a person. A piece of information here or
there is not very telling, but when combined, bits and pieces of data begin to form a portrait of
a person. The whole becomes greater than the parts."). Adding new information to video
images might, in some contexts, resemble a form of identification as also contemplated in
Professor Solove's taxonomy. See id. at 123 ("Identification is similar to aggregation because
both involve the combination of different pieces of information, one being the identity of a
person. However, identification differs from aggregation in that it entails a link to the person in
the flesh.").
53. See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 28, at 39 ("It's no secret that the digital medium is
characterized by high degrees of accessibility and persistence."); id. at 53 ("Many young people
are extremely likely to leave something behind in cyberspace that will become a lot like a
tattoo-something connected to them that they cannot get rid of later in life, even if they want
to, without a great deal of difficulty."); SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 33 ("The Internet ...makes
gossip a permanent reputational stain, one that never fades. It is available around the world,
and with Google it can be readily found in less than a second."); id. at 165 (citing Professor
McClurg's work suggesting that images have a quality of permanence that memories lack in the
sense that people can scrutinize an image and notice details they might not see when observing
the original situation); ZITrRAIN, supra note 2, at 211 ("Lives can be ruined after momentary
wrongs, even if merely misdemeanors."); Abril, supra note 49, at 75 ("Lacking the relative
transience of human memory, the digital record has increased the takes of privacy today .. ");
McClurg, supra note 12, at 928 ("[P]ersons whose private information is posted on the Internet
permanently lose control over that information and, hence, that aspect of their selves.").
54. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 184 ("Copyright in a photo is owned initially by the person
who takes the photo, not by the person whose photo is taken."); see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5)
(2006) (copyright exists in original pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works); id. § 101
("'Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' include two-dimensional and three-dimensional
works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps,
globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans.").
55. The subject of a photograph would be the copyright owner either because she used a
timer to take the picture or because someone else assigned copyright in the image to her.
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action would be available for unauthorized distribution of the video
online.56 Interestingly, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")
incorporated a notice-and-takedown regime that gives an immediate right to
have an image removed from a website on the basis of copyright
infringement. 57 However, no similar law has been enacted for intrusions into
an individual's privacy or dignity.
2.

Privacy Torts and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Laws regulating intrusive photography are unlikely to help image
subjects. While some privacy torts prohibit intrusions into seclusion, 58
conduct involving OSNs will generally not attract the operation of these
laws. Peer photographs are usually taken with the consent of the image
subject and in a non-intrusive fashion. 59 In many cases, the subject has no
objection to the taking of the picture, but may later be concerned about
viral online dissemination. Laws that regulate intrusive image-capturing are
therefore not much help when the subject's concern is with online
dissemination. An example of such a law appears in California's Civil Code.
While the Code regulates intrusive image-capturing, it does not sanction
later disseminating images so captured. 60 Other torts aimed at personal
privacy will likewise have little to no application. For example, the idea of an
unauthorized appropriation of a person's name or likeness will be of little
use in a peer context.6 1 For one thing, the appropriation is arguably
56. 17 U.S.C. § 106 sets out the rights of a copyright holder to prevent unauthorized
reproduction, distribution, and preparation of derivative works based on a copyrighted work. 17

U.S.C. § 106.
57. Id. § 512(c).
58. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a) (West 2009). The statute states:
A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the defendant knowingly
enters onto the land of another person without permission or otherwise committed
a trespass in order to physically invade the privacy of the plaintiff with the intent to
capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of
the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity and the physical invasion
occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person.
Id.
59. This would also be a shortcoming of the Camera Phone Predator Alert Act, H.R. 414,
111th Cong. (2009), if it were ever enacted. It deals only with intrusive image-gathering, and
not with any subsequent unauthorized dissemination. Id. § 3.
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(f) (West 2009). The statute instructs:
Sale, transmission, publication, broadcast, or use of any image or recording of the
type, or under the circumstances, described in this section shall not itself constitute
a violation of this section, nor shall this section be construed to limit all other
rights or remedies of plaintiff in law or equity, including, but not limited to, the
publication of private facts.

Id.
61. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 187 ("The appropriation tort would rarely apply to the
discussion on the Internet of people's private lives or the posting of their photos."). The same
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authorized if the subject has consented to the taking of the photograph. 62
For another thing, this tort requires a commercial-profit motive, 63 which is
generally absent in the OSN context, at least between peers.
Other privacy torts in the United States focus respectively on public
disclosure of private facts6 4 and on publicity which places a person in a false
light in the eyes of the public. 65 Both require some form of public
disclosure, 66 which may be missing in a closed social network such as
Facebook or MySpace. However, distribution over an open network such as

might be said about the right-of-publicity tort. 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, KARIN GREEN &
JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2B.01 (2009), available at LEXIS,
Gilson on Trademarks File ("The right of publicity is the right of [an individual] to control the
commercial use of his or her name, visual likeness, signature symbol, or other personal
characteristics.").
62.
Of course, there may be cases where the taking of the image is initially authorized, but
its subsequent use in a commercial context is unauthorized. The commercial-use requirement,
however, will generally not be met when peers are simply posting images of each other online.
63.
Appropriation actually appears as both a distinct limb of privacy law in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, and as a stand-alone tortious action in a number of American
state jurisdictions known variously as the "right of publicity" or "personality rights tort." See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) ("One who appropriates to his own use or
benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy."). For an example of a right-of-publicity tort, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997).
The statute states:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes
of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods
or services, without such person's prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the
prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.
Id.
64. For a discussion of current problems and future directions with this branch of privacy
law in the online context, see Patricia Sdnchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World,
21 HARV.J.L. &TECH. 1 (2007).
65.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). Section 652D states:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a
kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of
legitimate concern to the public.

Id.
66.

Id. § 652E. Section 652E states:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the other would be placed.

Id.; see also Abril, supra note 64, at 17-27 (discussing practical difficulties of individual plaintiffs
in establishing requisite disclosures of private facts both in the physical world and online).
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YouTube or Flickr may provide a basis for bringing these tort claims. 67
However, even where there is a public disclosure, it remains an open
question whether the distribution will amount to a disclosure of private facts
or whether it will present a person in a false light. An individual may object
to the dissemination of an image even though it does not disclose any
private facts and does not present her in a false light. 68 The tort of public
disclosure of private facts also generally requires that the private facts in
question be shameful by an objective standard that is often difficult to
prove. 69 Additionally, the information must not qualify as newsworthy 70-- a
71
standard that has proven notoriously difficult to define.
Related to the privacy torts is the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 72 Like the privacy torts, intentional infliction of
emotional distress is likely to be of limited use in the situations under
consideration in this Article because of its emphasis on outrageous or
malicious conduct. 73 Much of the conduct described here may be careless or

67. A "closed" network is one in which the participants have some control over who has
access to information and videos they post online, while an open network is generally accessible
to anyone with an Internet connection. Of course, the degree to which a "closed" network is
actually closed in practice depends somewhat on the culture of its users. For example, if all
Facebook users failed to use appropriate privacy settings, the network would effectively function
as an open network.
68. One example of this, although not a "peer" based incursion into privacy is the "lady
eating a peach" video that David Letterman repeatedly showed on his late-night television
program. It embarrassed the woman who was caught on camera eating an over-ripe peach
indelicately at the U.S. Open, but it did not show anything false about her. David Usborne,
Peach Lady Puts Squeeze on TV Star, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 7, 1996, available at http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/peach-lady-puts-squeeze-on-tv-star1317718.html.
69. Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private
Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 439 (1996) ("Whether a fact is private by nature-that is, whether a
reasonable person would feel seriously aggrieved by its disclosure-is the subject of some
disagreement.").
70. Abril & Cava, supra note 18, at 265 ("[T]o succeed on a privacy tort claim, the
disclosed information must not be of public concern. If the ... information disclosed is
newsworthy or of public concern, the aggrieved is precluded from recover in tort, as such
recovery is preempted by the formidable First Amendment.").
71. Mintz, supra note 69, at 441-42. Mintz states:
Facts of "legitimate public concern" or "newsworthy" facts, even if legally private,
may be disclosed without any liability under this tort. Regardless of whether a
plaintiff must affirmatively prove that facts disclosed were not newsworthy, or
whether defendants can be said to enjoy a privilege or a defense, many have
declared that the broad scope of the newsworthiness doctrine has "decimate [d] the
tort."
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
72.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).

73. Abril, supra note 49, at 81 (noting that the tort is ineffectual in the OSN context
because the conduct in question is usually not sufficiently "'extreme and outrageous'" and
because many courts require "physical manifestations" of the claimed emotional distress
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965))).
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thoughtless in terms of posting embarrassing images of one's friends or
acquaintances. However, it probably falls short of the outrageous or
malicious conduct required to state a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Of course, the characterization of this conduct might
change if courts reassess the contours of the tort of intentional infliction of
74
emotional distress in light of current online activities.
3.

Defamation

For defamation law to assist a person concerned about unauthorized
dissemination of an image online, the dissemination must amount to a
defamatory communication. 75 This requires proof that the image is both
false and harmful to the subject's reputation. 76 This is likely an
insurmountable hurdle in most cases involving OSNs. Images are unlikely to
be false for defamation purposes unless they have been doctored. Further,
defamation law can do little about the viral distribution of personal images
77
or the permanence problem. Online enforcement of a defamation order
can be problematic if the information in question exists on multiple websites
and in multiple jurisdictions by the time the order is made. 78 Additionally,
online intermediaries such as Internet service providers, who serve as
conduits for potentially defamatory content-and are often the easiest
potential defendants to identify-are generally statutorily immune from
liability.

79

4.

Data Protection Law in the European Union

While this discussion has so far focused largely on American privacy law,
international comparisons may be instructive. The European Union, for
example, provides stronger data protection for its citizens than the United
States. A cornerstone of the E.U. approach to privacy is the European Union

74. MILLS, supra note 28, at 195 ("The law [on intentional infliction of emotional distress]
is still in a stage of development, and the ultimate limits of this tort have not yet been
determined.").
75.
See Langvardt, supra note 13, at 334 (noting that a defamation claim applies to a
statement").
76.

See id. (identifying the elements of a common-law defamation claim).

77. Jennifer Meredith Liebman, Defamed by a Blogger: Legal Protections, Self-Regulation, and
Other Failures, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 343, 368-72 (describing different kinds of
defamation remedies that may be sought online, including a retraction, an injunction, and
damages).
78.
Id. at 368 (noting that even if the complainant obtains a retraction by the original
poster of defamatory content, the information is likely available in many other places online,
including places like the Internet Archive Project that preserves information already retracted
from websites).
79.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.").
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Data Protection Directive. 80 While the Directive is intended to have a wide
reach, it has some limitations in the OSN context. For one thing, it is
generally limited to conduct occurring within the European Union.8 ' Thus,
the Directive does not have global reach, but there are some provisions that
extend its operation to data about its citizens transmitted to third
countries. 82 Perhaps more importantly, it was drafted with textual data in
mind and focused largely on the context of business or government dealings
with personal information. There may be some question about the extent to
which it would apply in the OSN context.
While "personal data" is defined broadly as "any information relating to
an identified or identifiable natural person,"83 there are potentially two
important limitations. First, the Directive covers "information processing
activities," which largely contemplates professional, governmental, or
commercial activities involving compilations of individual information.
"Processing," however, is defined broadly to encapsulate "any operation or
set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage,
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction."8 4 Thus, the broad definition
of personal data could include digital video images, and the broad
definition of processing could include dissemination of those images over an
OSN.
The second limitation on the Directive's operation may be more
problematic. Article 3(2) creates an exception for the processing of personal
data "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household
activity."8 5 Social-networking activities might well fall within this category. If
so, social-networking activities would not be covered by the Directive. Of
course, the Directive may apply to OSNs that provide forums for online
networking, such as Facebook, MySpace, and Flickr. These services are
businesses that are not engaged in purely personal or household activities.

80. Council Directive 95/46, Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 OJ. (L 281) (EC) (discussing the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the protection of
the free movement of such data).
81. Most of the articles of the Directive apply to Member States of the European Union.
However, some provisions impact transfers of data to third countries. See id. arts. 25-26.
82.

Id.

83.
84.

Id. art. 2(a).
Id. art. 2(b).

85.

Council Directive 95/46 art. 3(2); see Opinion 5/2009 on Online Social Networking, § 3.1

(June 12, 2009),

available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/

2009/wp163_en.pdf (discussing application of the "purely personal or household use"
exemption in the online social-networking context).
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86
An aggrieved plaintiff may have recourse against a social-networking site,
but arguably not against specific peers who post unauthorized images on the
service.
Interestingly, in 2003, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")
interpreted article 3(2) as inapplicable to a situation where an individual
publicly posted information on the Internet about some of her friends from
a church group. 87 The court's primary concern was the generally public
character of the information disclosure. 88 It remains to be seen whether
similar reasoning would apply to video records, as opposed to text records,
or whether the reasoning would apply to closed networks in addition to
open Internet sites. Would posting information on a closed site such as
Facebook meet this criterion when arguably only a limited number of
people can access the information? 89 The ECJ was also concerned that
particularly sensitive information relating to a health condition-a foot
injury-had been disclosed on the Internet. 90 Health information receives
special protection under the Directive. 9 1 It remains to be seen whether the
ECJ's reasoning would apply to less-sensitive information, such as someone
being photographed drinking at a party or kissing their best friend's
girlfriend.

86. Of course, in the United States, there is a possibility that actions against online service
providers relating to the posting of information by users of the service would fail because of the
operation of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1) (2006), which immunizes Internet intermediaries from suit
with respect to the speech of others.
87.
Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. 1-12971,
paras. 46-48, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
62001J0101:EN:HTML.
88.

Id. para. 47.

89.
A recent opinion by the European Commission Working Group reviewing the Data
Protection Directive in the social-networking context attempted to clarify the application of the
"personal or household use" exception to social networks. See Opinion 5/2009 on Online Social
Networking, supra note 85, § 3.1.1. The Working Group stated:
Typically, access to data ... contributed by a user [of an OSN] is limited to selfselected contacts. In some cases, however, users may acquire a high number of
third party contacts, some of whom he may not actually know. A high number of
contacts could be an indication that the household exception does not apply ....
Id.
90.
Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. 1-12971,
para.
15,
available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=
79968893C19010101&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET.
91.
Council Directive 95/46 art. 8(1), Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC)
("Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the
processing of data concerning health or sex life." (emphasis added)).
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LIMITATIONS OF CONTRACTUAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS

OSNs' terms of use may provide another possibility for protecting
online-video privacy. OSNs currently vary widely in the extent to which they
impose terms on their users to respect others' privacy.92 YouTube and Flickr,
for example, allow large-scale public dissemination of video with few privacy
protections. These services exercise some control over content,93 but rely
heavily on users to self-police. 94 Yahoo!'s terms of service, for example,
which are expressly incorporated into agreements to use Flickr, provide that
each subscriber agrees not to use the online service to upload or distribute
content that is "unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, tortious,
defamatory, vulgar, obscene, libelous, invasive of another'sprivacy, hateful, or
racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable." 95 YouTube's terms of service
provide that users agree not to post material that is "copyrighted, protected
by trade secret or otherwise subject to third party proprietary rights,
including privacy and publicity rights" without permission of the rights96
holder.
Some closed networks such as Facebook incorporate more strongly
worded privacy protections into their terms of use. Not only does Facebook
97
include a clause very similar to the above terms from Yahoo! and YouTube,
92. OSNs can also change terms at any time without notice to the consumer. In fact, in the
early days of the Internet, a Canadian court expressly recognized a general Internet service
provider's ability to do just that-and was prepared to enforce the changed terms. 1267623
Ontario Inc. v. Nexx Online, Inc., No. C20546/99, 1999 O.T.C. LEXIS 1670, *21 (Ont. Super.
Ct. June 14, 1999) (Can.) ("[Defendant] is permitted to add terms to the Contract precluding a
... client sending unsolicited bulk e-mail directly, or through a third party."); Abril & Cava,
supra note 18, at 267 (noting that online contracts are effectively built on shifting sands and can
be changed unilaterally without notice to consumers).
93. See, for example, clause 7.B of YouTube's terms of service which provides that
YouTube reserves the right to decide whether Content or a User Submission is
appropriate and complies with these Terms of Service for violations other than
copyright infringement, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscene or
defamatory material, or excessive length. YouTube may remove such User
Submissions and/or terminate a User's access for uploading such material in
violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without prior notice and at its sole
discretion.
YouTube, Terms of Service, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
However, note that some commentators have suggested that many of these policies are not
actually enforced in practice. Abril, supra note 64, at 14 n.84 (noting that there is little to no
apparent enforcement of MySpace's terms of use as an example of lack of effective policing by
online social network services providers).
94. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Yahoo! Terms of Service, cl. 6, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/
yahoo/utos/utos-173.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) (relating to "Member Conduct");
YouTube, supra note 93, cl. 6(b) (relating to "Your User Submissions and Conduct").
95. Yahoo!, supra note 94 (emphasis added).
96. YouTube, supra note 93, cl. 6(d) (emphasis added).
97. Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, cl. 2, http://www.facebook.com/
terms.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
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it also requests that subscribers not use the service to upload any videos
other than those "of a personal nature that: (i) are of you or your friends,
(ii) are taken by you or your friends, or (iii) are original art or animation
created by you or your friends." 98 Additionally, Facebook's Statement of
Rights and Responsibilities provides that a Facebook member may not "post
content or take any action on Facebook that infringes or violates someone
else's rights or otherwise violates the law."99 The Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities also provides that consent is required to collect information
100
from Facebook users.
However, it is not clear whose permission is required to post what
information. For example, if I take a group photograph of my high-school
class, do I have to obtain the whole class's permission to post the
photograph? What form does that permission have to take? If I simply ask
my classmates at the time of taking the photo whether anyone minds if I post
the photo on my Facebook page, and no one expressly objects, would that
constitute permission? What if I take a photograph or video in a crowded
mall that includes people I know and people I don't know? Do I need to
obtain permission from all the photographic subjects to post the
photograph or video online? What if I take a video of two otters swimming
side by side (for some reason a popular YouTube contributionll)? Whose
permission do I need, if any, to show this video online? The zookeeper's?
Any bystanders who may appear in the picture? What if one of the
bystanders is doing something embarrassing, such as picking her nose or
breastfeeding her baby? What if one of the bystanders is kissing or holding
hands with a homosexual partner, and it turns out that the person is not
openly gay? Do I owe any greater concern for their privacy because of the
potential discomfort, embarrassment or harm it might cause them to have
people see this conduct online?
With respect to personal information other than identification
documents and sensitive financial information, it is not always clear that a
rights-holder exists in this context as contemplated by many OSN terms of
use or statements of user rights and responsibilities. Even if there is an
obvious victim harmed by the posting of an image, the nature of her legal
rights in the image is unclear. Some commentators have suggested that
98. Id.; see also Facebook, Content Code of Conduct, http://www.facebook.com/
codeofconduct.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). Facebook further provides its users with a set of
privacy principles organized around two "core principles," the second of which states: "There is

an increasing amount of information available out there, and you may want to know what
relates to you, your friends, and people around you. We want to help you easily get that
information." Facebook, Facebook's Privacy Policy, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last
visited Feb. 18, 2010).
99. Facebook, supranote 97.
100. Id. cl. 5(7).
101. YouTube Video: Otters Holding Hands (cynthiaholmes 2007), http://www.youtube.
com/watch;-=epUk3T2Kfno.
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privacy should be treated as an intangible property right, 10 2 but there is little
consensus on this point. 10 3 Thus, a provision that prohibits posting content

102. See SOLOVE, supra note 40, at 24-29 (critiquing property-based theories of privacy);
Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/InformationProperty, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1288-95 (2000)
(describing various theories of private information as property).
103. See SOLOVE, supra note 40, at 27 (discussing the difficulties of extending property
concepts to personal information). Solove stated:
Extending property concepts to personal information ... has difficulties.
Information can be easily transmitted and, once known by others, cannot be
eradicated from their minds. Unlike physical objects, information can be possessed
simultaneously within the minds of millions. This is why intellectual-property law
protects particular tangible expressions of ideas rather than the underlying ideas
themselves. The complexity of personal information is that it is both an expression
of the self and a set of facts---a historical record of one's behavior.
Id.; see also Litman, supra note 102, at 1294-95 (discussing the disadvantages of a privacy-asproperty solution). Litman stated:
Whether or not it could be easily implemented, a privacy-as-property solution
carries with it some serious disadvantages. Our society has a longstanding
commitment to freedom of expression. Property rights in any sort of information
raise significant policy and free speech issues. Facts are basic building blocks:
building blocks of expression; of self-government; and of knowledge itself. When
we recognize property rights in facts, we endorse the idea that facts may be
privately owned and that the owner of a fact is entitled to restrict the uses to which
that fact may be put. That notion is radical. It is also inconsistent with much of our
current First Amendment jurisprudence. Thus, the idea of creating property rights
in personal data raises fundamental constitutional issues. If it looked likely that a
property rights model would prove to be an effective tool for protecting personal
data privacy, it might be worthwhile to balance the privacy and free speech
interests to see which one weighed more.... [H]owever, a property rights model
would be ineffective in protecting data privacy. It would, in all likelihood, make the
problem worse.
Id.; see also Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 397-401 (1978) (critiquing
theories that favor personal property rights in private information); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill
of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665 (1992) (arguing that the increasing commodification of
information potentially impinges on First Amendment freedoms); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the PublicDomain, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 297, 348-49 (2004) (discussing why it is risky to allow individuals to own the use of their
life stories). Zimmerman stated:
[F]rom the birth of the common law right of privacy, courts recognized that there
is a downside to granting individuals control over how others can use information
about them. It significantly strips others of the wherewithal to form their own
ideas, utilize their own observations, and communicate about these things with
friends, colleagues, and fellow citizens. The fear of this unconstitutional
consequence is why broad newsworthiness rules have cabined the tort almost to the
point of annihilation. This strongly suggests that the ability to use speech goods is a
necessary element of what the First Amendment protects, and that, as a result, it is
very risky to allow individuals to 'own' or control use of their life stories.
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that violates someone else's rights may have particularly unclear application
in the privacy context.
What about a video subject's standing to bring a complaint under an
OSN's terms of use? Even if that person can establish a sufficient legal
interest in her image to satisfy provisions such as Facebook's prohibition on
posting information in violation of another person's rights, her recourse
would be to complain to the OSN provider. It would be up to the provider to
decide whether the complaint had any merit and whether to take any action
against the subscriber, such as removing the posting, or barring the
subscriber from the system. 10 4 The complainant probably has no standing to
sue the service provider directly because she is not a party to the subscriber's
contract with the service provider. Additionally, at least in the United States,
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act probably immunizes the
10 5
service provider from secondary liability for its subscribers' postings.
There are further limitations with relying on an OSN's terms of use to
protect privacy. Even Facebook's requirement that users limit their postings
to photographs of themselves and their friends (or photographs taken by
themselves or their friends) is open to interpretation. On a closed network
like Facebook, the term "friends" means something different than the way
we use the term in the physical world. 10 6 In the physical world, we know
whether or not we are acquainted with a person. We may not know them,
and we may even have forgotten their name, but we are unlikely to consider
someone we have never met to be a friend.
This is quite different online. 10 7 A "friend" on Facebook is anyone who
has given another person permission to join their online network of

104.

See, e.g.,
YouTube, supra note 93, cl.7.B. It states:
YouTube reserves the right to decide whether Content or a User Submission is
appropriate and complies with these Terms of Service for violations other than
copyright infringement, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscene or
defamatory material, or excessive length. YouTube may remove such User
Submissions and/or terminate a User's access for uploading such material in
violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without prior notice and at its sole
discretion.

Id.
105. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.").
106. ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 218 (noting that a person's "friends" network online
includes their "friends' friends' friends"); see Abril & Cava, supra note 18, at 255 ("The online
social networking environment has brought about a sweeping change in its users' notions of
intimacy, friendship, and confidentiality.").
107. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWAL. REv. 1137, 1154-56 (2009)
(noting the shortcomings of the term "friend" in the online-networking context).
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"friends," whether or not the two have ever met.10 8 Although Facebook
contemplates that its subscribers will use the service to find people online
whom they already know in the real world, 10 9 there is no way to ensure that
this is the case in practice. It is easy to make anonymous online contacts on
Facebook, and for those contacts to quickly be considered friends.110 These
contacts will increase the potential recipients of information on a
subscriber's site to many people whom the subscriber, and any other person
who is the subject of any information on the subscriber's website, may not
actually know. 111 Thus, the concept of "friends" in a closed network's terms
of use may be a deceptively comforting concept. 112 Commentators have
108. Id. at 1175 ("Facebook 'friends' include not just people we'd call 'friends' offline but
also those we'd call 'acquaintances' (to say nothing of the Fakesters). Contact links are a
mixture of what sociologists would call 'strong ties' and 'weak ties.'").
109. For example, Facebook's information on finding friends online states: "Your friends
on Facebook are the same friends, acquaintances and family members that you communicate
with in the real world." Facebook, Find Your Friends on Facebook, https://register.facebook.
com/findfriends.php?reflfriends (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). Facebook also prohibits the use of
aliases online so that people who think they are being contacted by someone they actually know
are really being contacted by that person. For example, the User Conduct clause of Facebook's
Terms of Use prohibits impersonating any person, falsely representing yourself, and creating a
false identity. Facebook, supra note 98.
110. Grimmelmann, supra note 107, at 1162-63.
Facebook is great at making us feel like we know lots of people.... The pictures,
names, and other informal touches make each contact look like a well-known
friend. That's socially satisfying, but primate brains only seem capable of
maintaining between one and two hundred close relationships at a time. Everyone
else isn't a close friend, and that socially thick sense of mutual personal obligation
that keeps confidences confidential doesn't always operate as strongly as we expect.
Id.
111.

Craig Wilson, The Final Word: Sorry, Charlie, Imaginary Friends Come and Go, USA TODAY,

June 9, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/life/columnist/finalword/2009-06-09-final-wordN.
hun (noting that "friends" on social-networking sites are very much like the imaginary friends of
one's childhood days). Of course, the practical problems can potentially be greater on an open
network that does not even attempt to limit dissemination of information to "friends."
112.
Grimmelmann, supra note 107, at 1174 ("[A]s Clay Shirky observes, '"[F]riend of a
friend of a friend" is pronounced "stranger."'" (second alteration in original)). One could
argue that in the online world individuals have a responsibility to exercise more care than they
currently do about who they befriend. The problem is that this is easier said than done. In the
real world there are physical constraints on who can be befriended and how many friends one
can make-in terms of time and geography. Additionally, in the physical world, one can glean
more cues than in virtual space about whether the rewards of befriending someone outweigh
the risks. These cues come from watching the person interact in real-world situations. In
physical spaces, we also recognize different "levels" of friendship. We can thus repose less trust
in someone we do not know very well. In the OSN context, however, the choice is effectively
binary--someone is either your "friend," entitling them access to anything you post online, or
they are not your friend, and therefore not entitled to access your online materials at all.
SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 202 (noting that technologies like Facebook require a binary definition
of the term "friend"-a "friend" is permitted access to your information but a non-friend is
not-while a social network in the real world is much more complex). There are no gradations
of friendship online, although there is no necessary technological impediment to developing
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recognized a number of additional limitations with reliance on contractual
mechanisms to protect privacy online. These limitations include the fact that
such contracts are often not consistently enforced and the fact that there are
insufficient inexpensive and accessible online dispute-resolution services
available for contract-based disputes. 113 Another shortcoming of reliance on
contractual privacy protections is the fact that the onus is currently on users
of an online service to continually check back for changes in privacy
policies. 114 As these policies often vary from service to service, and as
Internet users tend to use a variety of services, 115 this can be a particularly
onerous burden. Contractual terms about privacy are also often written in
116
abstract or legalistic terms that are difficult for users to comprehend.
III. WHY (NOT) REGULATE VIDEO PRIVACY?

A.

RESERVATIONS ABOUT VIDEO-PRIVACYREGULATION

So far, this Article has addressed practical problems relating to digital
video privacy, as well as current gaps in the regulatory framework. Despite
these problems, a number of criticisms-or cautions-may counsel against
creating new regulations for video privacy online. First, there is no accepted
theoretical basis for regulating privacy. The law is unclear whether privacy is
such levels. A system could be developed in the future that would allow users to exercise
discretion about who received what, and how much, information from them. This could be
done by building more "levels of friendship" into OSN technologies. Thus, one could identify
online peers as either "good friends," "friends," or "acquaintances" and differentiate levels of
access to personal information accordingly. Abril & Cava, supra note 18, at 272 (suggesting the
development of levels or "zones" of relationships in the context of private health information
available online); Grimmelmann, supra note 107, at 1172 (noting the generally binary nature of
friendship online, but that technical architectures can develop to increase precision of
connections online-although Grimmelmann himself is skeptical about the benefits of this
approach).
113. Abril & Cava, supra note 18, at 267 ("Spotty enforcement and lack of mechanisms for
dispute resolution further weaken the power of contract law online.").
114. Id. ("Website contracts are built on shifting sands. The professed ability of many
operators to change terms of use at any moment and without prior notice leaves users in a
constant state of uncertainty about their rights and privacy expectations."). This might also
explain an unusual finding in a survey recently conducted by Professors Levin and Abril in
which more college-student respondents said they "understand" an OSN's privacy policy than
admitted to actually readingthe privacy policy. Professors Levin and Abril suggest that this could
mean that the recipients assume they know what is in policies without actually reading them
because they have general familiarity with terms that usually appear in these policies. Avner
Levin & Patricia S~nchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11 VAND.J. ENr. &TICH. L. 1001,
1035 (2009).
115. Abril & Cava, supra note 18, at 267 ("[T]erms of use and privacy policies vary from
website to website, making true understanding of each contract ... difficult and impracticable,
especially since most users visit several websites a day.").
116. Id. ("Many user contracts are written abstrusely or in a legalistic style, dissuading even
the most punctilious consumer from taking time out of her online pursuit to carefully read and
understand them.").
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a property right, an aspect of personhood, or something else. 117 In the
absence of a clear and unified theoretical underpinning for privacy rights,
some may argue that regulation is undesirable.
Second, some argue it is more appropriate to regulate specific harms
resulting from discrete privacy incursions than to regulate privacy
generally. 118 Discrete harms may include loss of employment1 19 or
employment prospects, 120 physical injury, 121 psychological harm, 122 and
denial of access to education or health services. Third, the First Amendment
may pose an insurmountable barrier to the regulation of truthful speech
about private individuals, at least in the United States. A final concern about
regulating video privacy is the idea that the scale and global nature of
online-privacy problems renders such regulation impracticable. The
remainder of this Article addresses these issues and suggests a way of
regulating video privacy in light of these concerns. 123
B.

THE SEARCH FORA UNIFIED THEORY OFPRIVACY

One thorny issue in any discussion of reworking or extending privacy
protections is the question regarding privacy's theoretical basis. Despite
more than a century of discourse about the legal nature of privacy, 124 no

117.
See Levin & Abril, supra note 114, at 1010-17 (comparing American and European
attitudes to privacy in terms of whether privacy is theoretically regarded as a "control" fight or

an aspect of human dignity); SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 110-13 (comparing "libertarian" and
"authoritarian" approaches to privacy).
118. Strahilevitz, supra note 27, at 1737. Strahilevitz suggests:
[T]here will be settings in which the government can reduce the prevalence of
unlawful discrimination by publicizing previously private information about
individuals. For example, the best available empirical evidence suggests that
publicizing criminal history information could reduce racial discrimination in the
employment of blue-collar and service workers.... [A] similar strategy might
reduce the prevalence of statistical discrimination in the prescription of narcotics
and the pricing of automobile insurance premiums.
Id.
119.

As in the dog-poop girl example. See supratext accompanying notes 2-5.

120. As in the AutoAdmit case, which involved the unauthorized posting of sexually explicit
information about Yale students, one of whom alleged she lost a job offer as a result of the
posting. Isaac Arnsdorf, AutoAdmit Case Moves Forward,YALE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 31, 2008, available
at http://www.yaledailynews.com/articles/view/23231.
121. As in the Bus Uncle example. See supratext accompanying note 10.
122. As in the case of Star Wars kid. See supratext accompanying notes 6-9.
123. The first three issues are addressed infra Part III, while the final issue about the
practicality of regulating for video privacy online is addressed infra Part IV, along with the
discussion of a suggested framework for video-privacy regulation.
124. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 105-10 (describing nineteenth-century approaches to
privacy).
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consensus has emerged. 125 Some commentators have argued that it is not
necessary to identify any one unifying theoretical framework for privacy in
order to regulate it effectively. 126 The idea here is that we can formulate a
regulatory framework by identifying actual harms resulting from privacy
incursions.1 27 This may be the right approach-at least for the present time.
This approach is not as unusual as it might seem. Many legal rights-notably
128
intangible property rights-developed organically as needs arose.
Trademarks, for example, developed to address unfair competition
12 9
relating to the false or misleading branding of goods or services.
Controversy still exists regarding whether trademarks are appropriately
characterized as property rights. 1 30 Similarly, theoretical justifications vary

In fact, even Professor Solove's groundbreaking attempts to create a conception or
125.
taxonomy of privacy are not pinned down to one concrete, unifying theory. SOLOVE, supra note
40, at 105. Solove argues:
My taxonomy's categories are not based upon any overarching principle. We do
not need overarching principles to understand and recognize problems.... If we
focus on the problems, we can better understand and address them. I aim to shift
the approach to a bottom-up focus on problems that are all related to each other,
yet not in exactly the same way.
Id.; see also Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1129 (2002) ("[T]his
Article advances an 'approach' to understanding privacy rather than a definition or formula for
privacy.... My approach is from the bottom up rather than the top down because it
conceptualizes privacy within particular contexts rather than in the abstract.").
126.

Solove, supra note 125, at 1129.

127.

Id.;Jacqueline Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).

Of course, there are costs and benefits to this approach. Organic development can fail
128.
to take into account the complex matrix of interests that need to be balanced, such as the need
to balance free-speech interests against property interests and to distinguish different types of
information speech and information property. See, e.g., Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra
note 103. It is also possible that an organic approach might miss a critical period for regulatory
decision-making after which regulations are difficult to implement and enforce, particularly if
they would contradict entrenched social norms of behavior. See Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of
Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241, 249
(2006) (exposing instances when the interaction of privacy and technological diffusion
underlie social tensions); Bernstein, supra note 30, at 937 (discussing why timing is vital in
combating the entrenchment of non-privacy norms). These articles are advocating an approach
that allows some organic, incremental development while at the same time remaining sensitive
to points at which legal regulation-or other regulatory approaches discussed infra Part IV-are
necessary.
129.
BEVERLY W. PATFISHALL, DAVID C. HILLIARD &JOSEPH N. WELCH II, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION DESKBOOK § 1.02 (2d ed. 2003).
See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
130.
1687, 1693-94 (1999) (noting that in the context of U.S. law it is very difficult to find a
rationale for treating trademarks as a form of property). This may be compared with
jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and Australia where trademarks are explicitly defined as
a form of personal property in the relevant legislation. Trade Marks Act, 1995, § 21 (1) (Austl.)
(specifically defining a "trade mark" as a personal property right); Trade Marks Act, 1994,
§ 2(1) (U.K.) ("A registered trade mark is a property right obtained by the registration of the
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for the legal protection of trade secrets."' 1 Nevertheless, both systems work
in practice. Internet domain names, likewise, possess an uncertain legal
status as property. 132 The domain-name system, however, continues to
function, while market forces, social norms, and judicial and arbitral
decisions133 iron out the underlying philosophical creases. Could privacy
similarly emerge as an intangible property right over time? Property rights in
information have always been contentious.13 4 They create concerns about
chilling speech, 13 5 and governments who create property rights in
information must act to preserve the balance between those property rights
and speech rights. This difficult task is not always successfully achieved in
practice.' 3 6 A further issue concerns why personal information should be

trade mark under this Act and the proprietor of a registered trade mark has the ights and
remedies provided by this Act.").
131. SeeJacqueline Lipton, Protecting Valuable Commercial Information in the DigitalAge: Law,
Policy, and Practice, 6 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 9-15 (2001), available at http://grove.ufl.edu/
-techlaw/vol6/issuel/lipton.html (comparing the theoretical treatment of trade secrets in
differentjurisdictions, including Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
132. For example, in some contexts domain names have been regarded as a form of
intangible personal property. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2006) (allowing in rem. proceedings
against domain names as property in certain circumstances); Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024,
1024-30 (9th Cir. 2003) (treating domain names as property for the purposes of California's
conversion law); see also MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND
THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 58-61 (2002) (discussing the nature of claims to property rights in
domain names). In other contexts, domain names are regarded as the object of a contractual
license with a registering authority. See Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d
80, 86 (Va. 2000) (refusing to regard domain names as a new form of property for the purpose
of garnishment proceedings).
133. Arbitral decisions on domain names are actually very common under the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy incorporated by reference into many domain name
contracts. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm
(last
visited Feb. 18, 2010).
134. SOLOVE, supra note 40, at 24-29 (critiquing property-based theories of privacy);
Litman, supra note 102, at 1288-94 (describing various theories of private information as
property).
135. See Litman, supra note 102, at 1294-95 (arguing that the increasing commodification
of information potentially impinges on First Amendment freedoms); Zimmerman, Information
as Speech, supranote 103, 665-68 (same); Zimmerman, The Public Domain, supra note 103, at 310,
348-49 (same).
136. In a federal system, the propertization of information can raise constitutional
questions about which level of government has legislative competence to enact relevant laws.
Perhaps even more significantly, some have argued that no government may have constitutional
competence to recognize or create property rights in factual personal information because of
potential encroachments on First Amendment freedoms. See SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 129-32
(describing problems in attempting to balance privacy torts with the idea of free speech);
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The TroublingImplications of a Right to
Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1060-61 (2000) (suggesting that

tortious approaches to protecting privacy cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment, but
that contractual approaches may avoid this criticism); Zimmerman, The Public Domain, supra
note 103, at 298, 312, 366-69 (arguing in favor of a mandatory public domain, which may
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regarded as property in the hands of its subject. It is tempting to say that if
something has value, it should be treated as property. The problem with this
reasoning is that much of the economic value in online information has
been in data aggregators' text records. 137 While there may be good reasons
to create property in compilations of text records,1 38 it is not necessarily
clear that personal information in the hands of the individual to whom it
13 9
relates is a valuable commodity in its own right.
Scholars have argued that property rights would give a data subject
more control over the information in a transactional sense. 14° However, if
individuals have insufficient economic bargaining power against data
aggregators, the existence of a property right in the individual's hands will
be of limited use. In the OSN context, there is arguably even less need to
recognize a property right to protect individual privacy in video images-at
least if the justification for the property right is economic value. This is
because private individuals networking over OSNs are not generally doing so
for transactional purposes that would justify or necessitate a property right
in their personal information. 141 Of course, not all property rights are
encroach on the government's ability to create property rights that would interfere with the
public domain of information and ideas); Diane Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A
Farewellto Warren and Brandeis'sPrivacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 306-20 (1983) (suggesting
that torts prohibiting true speech cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment).
137. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1502-03 (2000)
(noting that the value of a piece of data in a consumer's hands is much less than the value of
the aggregated data about many consumers in a data aggregator's hands).
138. See, e.g., Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing PrivateRights and Public Policies: Reconceptualizing
Property Rights in Databases, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 776 (2003) (suggesting that property
interests in databases should benefit those that "invested time, effort, or financial resources" in
creating the database); Jerome Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in
Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997) (discussing how databases need protection from freeriding competitors).
139. Froomkin, supra note 137, at 1502-03.
140. Ann Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization,and Gender, 34 U.S.F. L. REV.
633, 687 (2000). Bartow stated:
Simply put, if information about us is to be bought and sold, the initial purchase
should be from us, since we are the ultimate content providers. If intangible
property rights are rewards for the effort expended in creating the thing to be
protected, we are entitled to ownership of our personal information.
Id.
141. There may be a justification for imputing a property right to the OSN provider in
respect of its meta-collection of data on the grounds that OSN operators do utilize this data for
commercial purposes. However, even that argument is tenuous in situations where an OSN
does not transact with the data per se, but rather utilizes its vast user base as an incentive to
attract advertisers. This may be changing in practice. Recent attempts at social-ad programs by
some OSNs do utilize specific data about individuals and their online relationships with friends
to better target advertising to their users. Posting of Megan McCarthy to Epicenter, http://blog.
wired.com/business/2008/01/facebook-ads-ma.html (Jan. 2, 2008, 3:20 pm); Posting of
William McGeveran
to Info/Law, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2007/11/08/
facebook-social-ads/ (Nov. 8, 2007).
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justified on the basis of economic value, 142 but property rights and economic
worth are often aligned in practice.
Placing economic considerations aside, property rights may be
characterized by other attributes: the ability to exclude others; the ability to
enjoy an item free from interference; or the ability to alienate or transfer
rights, whether or not for commercial gain. 143 Personal information typically
lacks these proprietary attributes. It would be difficult for an individual to
function in society, particularly online, without leaving footprints involving
disclosures of personal information. Thus, there is no way to exclude others
from personal information or to exclude them from enjoying the
information free from interference. Sometimes other people acquire
personal information through the contractual requirement of disclosure to,
for example, complete a purchase. 144 Other times, the information is
incidentally observed as part of functioning in society. For example, if you
go to the shops, people will see what you look like, and a security camera
may capture an image of you in a department store. 145 Online, individuals
constantly leave digital footprints involving these kinds of personal
information. 146 Of course, advocates of property rights in personal
information may argue that it is these very aspects of personal privacy that
require a property label. The necessity of transacting with this information
on a daily basis requires that individuals be entitled to bargain for exchanges
involving the information. 147 However, this is a circular argument. It
assumes that something should be labeled property because individuals are
forced to disclose it, and therefore, individuals should be compensated for
148
such disclosures.

142.
In fact, Professor Charles Fried implicitly accepted the proprietary nature of privacy in
the context of interpersonal relationships where the privacy right would have no real economic
value, but only social value. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 487 (1968) (describing

privacy as a form of "moral capital for personal relations" and referring to holding "tide" to
information about oneself).
143. Courtney C. Tedrowe, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 586, 591 (2000) (identifying classic property rights as including rights of
exclusion, disposition, and use).

144. For example, details of a credit card or postal address are required for payment or
shipping purposes.
145.

SeeJerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1198

(1998) (describing how, in a visit to a mall, pinpoint information about a person's movements
and identity is not recorded-with the exception of credit card purchases).
146. See id. (contrasting how "in cyberspace, the exception becomes the norm").
147. Bartow, supra note 140, at 704 ("Once I own my own data, I personally look forward to
formulating a reverse 'click-wrap' license, whereby any enterprise that wants me to visit its web
site will have to agree to MY list of terms and conditions. . .. ").
148. Maybe such arguments would be justified on the basis of unjust enrichment. In other
words, data-aggregating businesses are unjustly enriched by individuals if they can put together
valuable consumer profiles using information "belonging to" consumers without compensating
them for it. However, this analysis assumes the existence of an underlying property or quasi-
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In addition to property theories, arguments based on autonomy and
personhood may support granting a data subject legal rights in personal
information. 149 In attempts to explain the philosophical underpinnings of
the right of publicity, which is derived from the right to privacy,
commentators have suggested basing such rights on notions of autonomy
and personhood. 150 This is a possibility, but the theoretical contours of
rights of personhood are unclear. 15 1 In the end, an approach based on
personhood may not prove any more useful than trying to pin down privacy
as a form of property. Ultimately, those who argue in favor of taking a
bottom-up approach to developing privacy regulation in the absence of one
clear unifying theory-similar to the trademark and trade-secret legal
1 52
regimes-probably have the right idea, at least for the present time.
Privacy harms today are real and observable, and the search for a single
unifying theory may take too long to address the pressing needs facing
1 53
online societies today.

property right in the plaintiff's personal information, so it is again circular. Andrew Kull,
RationalizingRestitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1214 (1995). Kull stated:
Restitution can be seen as an aspect of the legal protection of property, and many
instances of what the law characterizes as unjust enrichment might be described by
saying that the defendant has received property of the plaintiff by means of a
transfer that was legally ineffective to convey ownership.
Id.
149.
SOLOVE, supra note 40, at 29-34 (critiquing "personhood" theories of privacy); Abril,
supra note 64, at 7-8 ("[Olthers have defined privacy in terms of personhood, intimacy, and
secrecy."); Fried, supra note 142, at 483 (describing privacy as an "aspect of personal liberty");
Solove, supra note 125, at 1116-21 (discussing personhood theories of privacy); Daniel J.
Solove, "I've
Got Nothing to Hide" and Other Misunderstandingsof Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGo L. REv.
745, 760-61 (2007) (noting that many theories of privacy view the notion of privacy as an
individual right related to protecting the individual's personal dignity).
150.
See Jacqueline Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace: A Personality Rights Paradigmfor Personal
Domain Name Disputes, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1445, 1488 (2008) (explaining the right of
publicity as one based on both property theory and personhood).
151.
See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Casefor a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE
L.J. 383, 392-411 (1999) (explaining the confusion surrounding the right of publicity); Mark P.
McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PlTr. L. REV. 225, 225-32
(2005) (discussing the right-of-publicity context).
152.

SOLOVE, supranote 40, at 105. Solove stated:
My taxonomy's categories are not based upon any overarching principle. We do
not need overarching principles to understand and recognize problems . .. If we
focus on the problems, we can better understand and address them. I aim to shift
the approach to a bottom-up focus on problems that are all related to each other,
yet not in exactly the same way. If we study the problems together, we can better
understand the entire cluster.

Id.; see also Lipton, supra note 127.
153.

Bernstein, supra note 30.
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C. REGULATING SPECIFICHARMS
If privacy harms are real and observable, why not redress specific harms
rather than protecting privacy more generally? A number of commentators
suggest that redressing specific harms is preferable in light of First
Amendment concerns and the notion that attempting to regulate privacy
154
online today is like locking the barn door after the horse has bolted.
These commentators suggest that the best approach to remedying privacy
breaches is to focus on specific damages caused by leaks of personal
information, including discrimination in the workplace, in healthcare, and
in education. 155 Some have even argued that the benefits from a lack of
privacy could theoretically outweigh the costs. 156 One suggested benefit of
the wide-scale dissemination of personal information is that such
157
dissemination can help the public understand existing social norms.
However, there is reason to be skeptical of an approach that fails to consider
privacy as something worthy of protection in and of itself.
For one thing, many insecurities involving personal information do not
result in specific damage. Widespread unregulated online-privacy incursions
can create a general culture of unease where individuals cannot rely on
anyone to respect personal boundaries. 158 While there are good reasons for
addressing specific harms that result from privacy breaches, such as dogpoop girl's loss of her job and Star Wars kid's need for psychological
treatment, this does not preclude the need to adopt some regulations that
temper unbridled incursions into people's privacy by means of digital-video
technologies. Legislatures have developed laws to regulate intrusive digital
video photography. 59 However, effective regulation of online distributions

154. Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun Microsystems, said famously in 1999: "You have zero
privacy .... Get over it." Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: 'Get Over It', WIRED, Jan. 26, 1999,
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538 (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
155. DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998); SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 73-74; Strahilevitz, supra

note 27, at 1668 (arguing that basing decisions on real information, rather than dangerous and
discriminatory proxies such as race, actually provides social benefits overall).
156. BRIN, supra note 155; Strahilevitz, supra note 27 (arguing that basing decisions on real
information rather than dangerous and discriminatory proxies such as race actually provides
social benefits overall); Volokh, supra note 136, at 1120 (arguing that the government should
not use privacy torts as a proxy for anti-discrimination laws).
157. Lior Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 928 (2005)
("[D]issemination [of personal information] can also help the public understand existing social
norms. Indeed, gossip is often central in theories of social norm enforcement and change.").
158. SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 97 ("[T]he invasion conception's focus on privacy invasions
as harms to specific individuals often overlooks the fact that certain privacy problems are
structural-they affect not only particular individuals but society as a whole.").
159. See, e.g., Camera Phone Predator Alert Act, H.R. 414, 111th Cong. (2009) (requiring
all cellular phones manufactured one year after the passage of the Act to make noise when the
user takes a picture in order to protect the privacy rights of children); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1708.8(b) (West 2009). The California Civil Code states:
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of personally humiliating, embarrassing, or damaging images is currently
missing.
D.

PRIVACY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Of course, regulating privacy involves incursions on truthful expression.
This obviously conflicts with the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech. 16° Professors Zimmerman and Volokh have expressed concerns that
privacy torts, in particular, risk unconstitutional encroachments on First
Amendment freedoms. 1 61 However, it is possible to better protect privacy
online without disturbing First Amendment rights. Even First Amendment
scholars have recognized other avenues for protecting privacy, including
express and implied contracts of confidentiality and extended breach-ofconfidence actions. 162 This Article also proposes an expanded concept of
regulation as a multimodal enterprise that does not rely on legislation alone
to protect privacy interests. While the First Amendment aims to protect
individual freedoms against government intrusions, it will generally allow
societies to develop social norms, market forces, and technological solutions
to perceived social problems. 163 Thus, this Article next considers how an

A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defendant attempts
to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual
image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a
personal or familial activity under circumstances in which the plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or auditory
enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image,
sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been achieved
without a trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing device was used.
Id.
160. This problem arguably has more resonance for the United States than some other
jurisdictions. In Europe, for example, both the right to privacy and the right to free expression
are enshrined as basic human rights that must be balanced against each other. See Council of
Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 8,
10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (describing guaranteed rights to privacy and freedom of
expression). The United States, on the other hand, has no express constitutional guarantee of a
right to privacy unlike the right to free speech which is enshrined expressly in the First
Amefidment.
161. Volokh, supra note 136, at 1051 ("While privacy protection secured by contract is
constitutionally sound, broader information privacy rules are not easily defensible under
existing free speech law."); id. at 1122 ("[R]estrictions on speech that reveals [sic] personal
information are constitutional under current doctrine only if they are imposed by contract,
express or implied."). Professor Zimmerman has also argued against the constitutionality of
privacy tort law on free-speech grounds. Zimmerman, supra note 136, at 320-41.
162. See infra Part IV.A.5 (discussing the possible use of contracts and breach-of-confidence
actions to enhance online privacy).
163. For a contrasting view, see Dawn Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace,
20 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 1115, 1121-28 (2005) (expressing concern that the increasing control
of public forums for speech in private hands, such as OSN providers, will curtail meaningful
First Amendment scrutiny and lead to arbitrary decisions about what kinds of speech are
available online).
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effective multimodal regulatory framework for digital-video privacy might be
developed, particularly given the global scale of online-video-privacy
problems.
IV. A MULTIMODAL APPROACH TO VIDEO PRIVACY

There will be no single sweeping reform that will bestow privacy on each of
US.
-ProfessorJon

Mills 164

The first and most important point about online-video-privacy
165
regulation is that there is no one solution to digital-age privacy problems.
This does not mean, however, that pursuing enhanced privacy protections is
futile. It simply means that regulation must be organic-adapting to societal
needs as they develop. It also means that we will likely need a more nuanced
approach than simply relying on legislation and judicial interpretations.
Professor Lawrence Lessig famously identified four regulatory modalities
that would be useful in cyberspace generally and that would help to develop
protections for online privacy specifically. 166 These modalities include legal
170
169
rules, 167 social norms, 168 markets, and system architecture.

164. MILLS, supra note 28, at 306.
165. Id.
166. See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 62-63
(1999) (identifying problems in current privacy protection in cyberspace and recommending a
new, multimodal approach).
167. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARv. L. REv.
501, 507 (1999). The author states:
Law ... orders people to behave in certain ways; it threatens punishment if they do
not obey. The law tells me not to buy certain drugs, not to sell cigarettes without a
license, and not to trade across international borders without first filing a customs
form. It promises strict punishments if these orders are not followed. In this way,
we say that law regulates.
Id.
168.

Id. Lessig discusses:
Norms control where I can smoke; they affect how I behave with members of the
opposite sex; they limit what I may wear; they influence whether I will pay my taxes.
Like law, norms regulate by threatening punishment ex post. But unlike law, the
punishments of norms are not centralized. Norms are enforced (if at all) by a
community, not by a government. In this way, norms constrain, and therefore
regulate.

Id. Not all norms will threaten punishment for disobedience. Some norms can be maintained
without any penalty for violation. Strandburg, supra note 33, at 1246-49 (discussing that
"coordination norms" can be maintained without imposing sanctions for noncompliance
because individuals have no incentive to deviate from norms that depend on a large group of
people performing the same action in the same way; "epistemic norms" do not require
sanctions because individuals conform to these norms as a means of economizing information
costs so there is no incentive for others to enforce the norms against individuals).
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Legal rules, the first modality, are imposed and enforced by
governments.'7 1 The second modality, social norms, is similar in operation
to legal rules. Norms threaten punishment for disobedience.172 However,
they differ from laws in that punishments are imposed by communities
rather than governments.' 73 Norms can be as effective, if not more effective,
than legal rules. 174 The informal penalties for violating norms, while often
less severe than legal punishments, have a greater likelihood of being
enforced than a legal rule in many contexts. 175 Markets, the third modality,
regulate by imposing price constraints on certain behaviors. 176 One example
in the privacy context would be where online firms charge more to
177
consumers for providing greater assurances of personal privacy.

169.
Lessig, supra note 167, at 507 ("Markets, too, regulate. They regulate by price. The
price of gasoline limits the amount one drives-more so in Europe than in the United States.
The price of subway tickets affects the use of public transportation-more so in Europe than in
the United States.").
170.

Id. at 507-09. Lessig finds that:
[T] here is a fourth feature of real space that regulates behavior-"architecture." By
"architecture" I mean the physical world as we find it, even if "as we find it" is
simply how it has already been made. That a highway divides two neighborhoods
limits the extent to which the neighborhoods integrate. That a town has a square,
easily accessible with a diversity of shops, increases the integration of residents in
that town. That Paris has large boulevards limits the ability of revolutionaries to
protest. That the Constitutional Court in Germany is in Karlsruhe, while the capital
is in Berlin, limits the influence of one branch of government over the other.
These constraints function in a way that shapes behavior. In this way, they too
regulate.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
171.

Id. at 508.

172.
Id. at 507. Subsequent literature demonstrates that norms are actually more complex
than this and that there are various different kinds of norms that operate in different ways. See
generally Strandburg, supra note 33 (discussing several norms and the ways in which they
operate). However, for the purposes of this discussion, Lessig's definition will suffice.
173.

Lessig, supranote 167, at 507.

174.
Strandburg, supra note 33, at 1248 ("Social norms often play a more important role
than legal regulation.").
175.
Id. ("When social norms are feasible they can be quite effective. Though the informal
penalties for violating social norms may be less severe than the penalties available under the
law, the likelihood of being penalized may be quite high.").
176.

Lessig, supra note 167, at 507.

177.
See Lessig, supra note 166, at 62 (analogizing online firms to firms in the physical
world). Of course, Professor Lessig here may have been contemplating privacy protections for
customers of service providers who are more likely to be posters of private information than
victims of unauthorized postings of private information by others. However, this would depend
upon the scope and nature of the privacy policy promulgated by a given online service provider.
Where an online service provider offered to protect privacy of both posters and subjects of
information and images, more people may be drawn to that service provider because of the
signals the service provider gives about being a generally good online corporate citizen. Some
online service providers do currently at least purport to protect the privacy of third parties as
well as their own customers-see discussion of relevant terms of use in Parts II.B and IV.A.5.
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Architecture, as the fourth modality, in contrast, regulates by physically

constraining certain behaviors. 178 In the real world, for example, the
erection of a border fence may constrain illegal immigration. 179 The
cyberspace analog to physical-world architecture is system architecture or
"code."180
None of these modalities operate in a vacuum. Their interaction
facilitates given behaviors.18 1 Additionally, these modalities are not
comprehensive. There are other modalities that usefully regulate online
conduct. Thus, we might also recognize modalities such as public
education 82 and private nonprofit institutions.183 The institutions
comprised in the private-nonprofit category might include OSNs, public184
interest organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF")
and the Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC"), 185 and academic
178.
179.

Lessig, supranote 167, at 507-08.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 122 (2004). Lessig stated:
A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across a river. Railroad tracks
might constrain the ability of a community to integrate its social life. As with the
market, architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post punishments.
Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects its constraint through
simultaneous conditions.

Id.; SOLOvE, supra note 16, at 98-99 (giving examples of ways in which physical architectures
can constrain behavior).
180. Lessig, supra note 167, at 509 ("[T]he architecture of cyberspace, or its code, regulates
behavior in cyberspace. The code, or the software and hardware that make cyberspace the way it
is, constitutes a set of constraints on how one can behave.").
181. LESSIG, supra note 179, at 123 ("[Tlhe first point about these four modalities of
regulation is obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced by
another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by another."); see also Froomkin,
supra note 137, at 1466 ("While there may be no single tactic that suffices to preserve the status
quo, much less regain lost privacy, a smorgasbord of creative technical and legal approaches
could make a meaningful stand against what otherwise seems inevitable."); Lessig, supra note
166, at 63-64 (suggesting a combined architecture-market solution to protecting privacy online
that relies in part on use of the Platform for Privacy Preferences ("P3P") designed by the World
Wide Web Consortium ("W3C")); Lessig, supra note 167, at 511-34.
182. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 203-04; Lilian Edwards & Ian Brown, Data Control and Social
Networking: Irreconcilable Ideas?, in HARBORING DATA: INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW, AND THE
CORPORATION 202, 222 (Andrea M. Matwyshyn ed., 2009).
183. Richards, supra note 36, at 420 (discussing the American Libraries Association's role of
protecting patrons' rights and freedoms in the library bill of rights in 1939 as an example of an
institution playing a regulatory role in promoting individual privacy).
184. The Electronic Frontier Foundation describes itself as "the leading civil liberties group
defending your rights in the digital world." Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.
org/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
185. The Electronic Privacy Information Center describes itself as "a public interest
research center in Washington, D.C. It was established in 1994 to focus public attention on
emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional
values." Electronic Privacy Information Center, About EPIC, http://www.epic.org/epic/about.
html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). The identification of new forms of regulatory modality is not
inconsistent with Professor Lessig's work-he did not intend for his four regulatory modalities
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institutions. 1 86 The remainder of this Part identifies the key features of each
of these six modalities and the ways in which these modalities might interact
to provide more effective protections for online privacy.
A.
1.

LEGAL RULEs

The Role of Law Online

[Liegal rules ... play a large part in establishing the social context of
[P]rivacy is not just an absence of information abroad about
privacy ....
ourselves; it is a feeling of security in control over that information. By
using the public, impersonal and ultimate institution of law to grant
persons this control, we at once put the right to control as far beyond
question as we can and at the same time show how seriously we take that
right.
-Professor

187
Charles Fried

Lawyers have a tendency to regard legal rules as the paramount-and
sometimes the only-solution to a problem. 18 8 However, laws have limitsespecially online.18 9 For instance, legal-enforcement mechanisms may prove
ineffective where harmful conduct involves anonymous wrongdoers
potentially situated anywhere in the world. Additionally, legislatures often
face complex policy choices in balancing competing interests such as
privacy, speech, and intellectual-property rights online. The novelty of much
online conduct also exacerbates these difficulties. Moreover, governments
often look to social norms to discern an appropriate policy basis for new
laws. However, in areas like online social networking, where many social
norms are not fully developed, governments may have difficulty identifying
appropriate directions for new laws. 190 The legislature is then faced with
deciding whether to attempt to create and communicate new norms
through its laws or to wait and see what norms develop before legislating.

to be the last word on cyberspace regulation. LESSIG, supra note 179, at 123 ("Whether or not
there are other constraints (there may well be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these
four are among the most significant.. ").
186.

See infra Part IV.F (discussing institutions as privacy regulators).

187. Fried, supranote 142, at 493.
188. LESSIG, supra note 179, at 121 ("Law is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at
least).").
189. PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 28, at 76 (noting that law cannot solve online privacy
problems by itself).
190. In contrast, some have argued that it is necessary for decision-makers, including
legislatures, to act before social norms have developed because failure to do so may result in an
inability to effectively regulate consistently with norms where the need arises. Bernstein, supra
note 30, at 943-46 (including a discussion of entrenchment of anti-privacy norms on the
Internet in the context of electronic commerce).
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Legal rules are therefore unlikely to provide the complete answer to
online-video-privacy problems.1 91 Legal rules will have an important place in
the regulatory matrix, but they cannot resolve online privacy issues on their
own. The challenge for regulators will be to identify exactly what role legal
rules should play and how those rules should interact with other forms of
regulation. Recently, commentators suggested that legal rules could improve
online-privacy regulation by recognizing reasonable expectations of privacy
even in public spaces traditionally unprotected by privacy torts; 92 better
protecting confidential relationships; 193 and allowing "individuals to exercise
greater control over their personal information ....

after it has been

exposed" to other people or even to the general public. 194 Various
approaches to legal regulation might prove fruitful in the video-privacy
context. Privacy law might, for example, usefully draw on some of the lessons
learned from digital copyright law and environmental regulation.
Additionally, legislatures could update privacy torts to better protect onlinevideo privacy. Legal rules might also promote contractual and technological
solutions to online-video-privacy problems. The following discussion
considers each of these possibilities in turn.
2.

Lessons from Digital Copyright Law

Concerns that copyright law has over-propertized online information in
195
the digital age counsels against drawing too heavily from copyright law.
Nevertheless, salient parallels exist between online privacy and the
protection of copyrighted works online. 196 Copyright law has been very
successful in protecting rights in online-video files despite early concerns
about the ability of copyright holders to exercise control over information in

191. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 193 ("There is ... a limit to how much the law can do. The
law is an instrument capable of subtle notes, but it is not quite a violin.").
192. Id. at 187. Professor Abril has also noted that, while many traditional privacy laws are
premised on a distinction between public and private conduct, this distinction has become
increasingly blurred in the digital information age, which has caused expectations of privacy to
become unstable and difficult to ascertain. Abril, supranote 64, at 5-6; see also ZITTRAIN, supra
note 2, at 212 ("Even the use of 'public' and 'private' to describe our selves and spaces is not
subtle enough to express the kind of privacy we might want [online]."); id. at 216 ("Peerleveraging technologies are overstepping the boundaries that laws and norms have defined as
public and private, even as they are also facilitating beneficial innovation.").
193.

SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 187; see Richards & Solove, supra note 40, at 135-38

(discussing confidential relations).
194. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 188.
195. See LESSIG, supra note 179, at 130 (noting that "the net effect of this massive increase in
protection will be devastating to the environment for creativity"); Pamela Samuelson, The
Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.
paperpr.html (discussing the maximalist agenda).
196. See SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 185 ("Copyright and privacy are both ways of controlling
information.").
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digital formats. 197 Thus, the copyright model counters the argument that it
is impossible to regulate video files online on the grounds that it is too
difficult to obtain effective control over these files. 198 Copyright law will
apply online regardless of whether the source accidentally exposed the
relevant information to the public 199 and even if the information is in a
digital format that can be readily copied. 200 Thus, the copyright model
demonstrates that it is technically possible to enact a law that controls the
flow of video information online
The similarities between copyright and privacy with respect to video
files include the following issues: (1) how to effectively control access to, and
use of, digitally available information; (2) how to balance the rights of an
information rights-holder against competing interests such as free speech
and other legitimate uses;20 1 (3) what kinds of liability, if any, Internet
intermediaries, such as Internet service providers, should face for the
unauthorized activities of others; 202 (4) how to identify appropriate forums
for dispute resolution in a global information society; (5) how to deal with
global disharmonization of relevant legal principles; 20 3 (6) how to identify
197.

Id. at 184-86.

198.

Id. at 184. The author considers:
Is control over information really feasible? If we expose information to others, isn't
it too difficult for the law to allow us still to control it? Perhaps the law is reticent
about granting control because of the practical difficulties. Information spreads
rapidly, sometimes like a virus, and it is not easily contained.

Id.
199.
Id. at 185 ("The copyright system focuses on the use of information-it allows certain
uses and prohibits others. And it does so regardless of whether the information has been
publicly exposed.").
200.
Id. ("[C]opyright law provides protection even when a work can be readily copied. I
don't have to take any steps to protect my work.").
201.
Legitimate uses might include those traditionally associated with copyright law, such as
news reporting on matters of public interest and some nonprofit educational uses. In the
privacy context, certain kinds of data aggregation might also be legitimate uses if the state

implements appropriate safeguards against unauthorized privacy invasions. See generally Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding a law requiring computerized data aggregation of
information relating to the prescription of certain medications and acknowledging that the
state implemented appropriate information-security safeguards).
202. Professor Solove notes that copyright law provides liability when third parties facilitate
a copyright violation. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 185.
203. For example, the European Union and United States take very different approaches to
privacy. The E.U. approach is largely codified in Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of October 24, 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (the "Data
Protection Directive"). The United States, on the other hand, takes a more piecemeal approach
to private data protection. RAYMOND S.R. KU &JACQUELINE D. LIPTON, CYBERSPACE LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 544 (2d ed. 2006) ("[T]o date, the United States largely relies upon unfair and
deceptive business practice law and self-regulation [to protect privacy]. In contrast, other
nations, and most notably, the European Union have taken more aggressive steps to protect
individual privacy in data collection.").
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wrongdoers in. a largely anonymous online medium; 20 4 and (7) how to
provide effective remedies for harms arising from the viral online
20 5
dissemination of protected information.
Copyright law has developed a notice-and-takedown regime to give
rights-holders the ability to request the removal of infringing material from
websites.20 6 This law also provides Internet intermediaries, like OSNs, a safe
harbor from secondary infringement liability. 20 7 The notice-and-takedown

idea could be extended to the privacy context if personal-privacy rights are
to be strengthened in digital video images. Of course, such an approach
must take into account the potential chilling impact on free speech.
Safeguards would need to be built into the system to ensure that the noticeand-takedown mechanism was not used frivolously to the detriment of
online expression. However, the privacy context likely generates less risk of
frivolous takedown notices than the copyright context where powerful
corporate copyright holders seem to resort to the takedown regime even in
the absence of a serious likelihood that a copyright infringement has
208
occurred.
Although digital copyright law may provide a useful model for
enhanced online privacy protections, parallels between copyright and
privacy are not perfect. The constitutional underpinnings for copyright and
privacy are quite different. Copyright law has clear and express origins in the
Federal Constitution, 20 9 while informational privacy does not.210 Thus,

204. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) allows copyright holders to seek identifying
information about alleged copyright infringers from third-party service providers. See also In re
Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d. 244, 246 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that an Internet
service provider challenged a subpoena served on it by the Recording Industry Association of
America seeking identifying information for alleged copyright infringers utilizing the ISP's
services).
205. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 184-85 (noting that copyright law will provide remedies even
when the source exposes information to the public and the information holder is not protected
against potential viral distribution).
206. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
207. Id. The privacy analog to this would be section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act of 1996, effectively immunizing ISPs for tort liability for speech posted by others utilizing
their services. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
208.

See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY

108-10 (2008) (describing abuses of notice-and-takedown procedure by powerful corporate
copyright holders); Jennifer Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects"?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 678 (2006) (finding data that reveals "an unfortunately high
incidence of questionable uses of the [takedown] process" in copyright-infringement law).
209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
210. Limited privacy rights have been implied into various constitutional clauses, but there
is no express grant of power for Congress to protect privacy. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC
ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAw 33 (2d ed. 2006) ("Although the
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Congressional protection of copyrighted works online is more easily justified
in the face of First Amendment concerns than the protection of privacy.
211
Additionally, digital-age copyright law has created its own imbalances,
which should be avoided when enhancing any legal protections for online
212
privacy.
3.

Lessons from Environmental Regulation

Environmental regulation is another legal field that may prove
instructive for online privacy, at least with respect to the role that OSN
providers might play. A growing trend in information-privacy law looks to
models of environmental regulation as a basis for ascertaining the best
practices for online privacy. 2 13 Commentators have noted that
214
environmental law has moved away from command-and-control models
toward second-generation initiatives that encourage regulated parties to
choose for themselves the means by which they will achieve regulatory
goals. 215 For example, the American Clean Air and Security Bill includes a
.cap and trade" plan for reducing global warming by allowing corporations
to trade in rights to discharge greenhouse-gas emissions within certain
levels. 216 Cap-and-trade systems exemplify second-generation regulatory
initiatives in the sense that they do not directly regulate-in terms of
mandating or prohibiting-specific activities in which regulated parties may

United States Constitution does not specifically mention privacy, it has a number of provisions
that protect privacy, and it has been interpreted as providing a right to privacy.").
211. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 208, at 108-20; LESSIG, supra note 179, at 161;
Samuelson, supra note 195.
212. Of course, even digital copyright law has been bolstered in many respects by contract
law and technical standards. Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital
Age, 67 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1111-43 (1998) (discussing uses of contractual and
technological measures with copyright law in attempts by copyright holders to protect their
rights online). This is another example of an important and necessary interaction between
distinct regulatory modalities-contract, architecture (technology), and law. Privacy-law
advocates considering these interactions today have an opportunity to achieve a better balance
of interests in the wake of some of the arguable failures of digital copyright law.
213. See Dennis D. Hirsch, Protectingthe InnerEnvironment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn
from EnvironmentalLaw, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2006) ("[E]nvironmental laws and policies can
serve as a model for protecting privacy in the Digital Age."); Deirdre K. Mulligan & Joseph
Simitian, Assessing Security Breach Notification Laws 1 (unpublished work, on file with the
author) (discussing how security-breach-notification laws can create an incentive for business
"to better secure personal information" and for consumers to support "privacy protective
behaviors" based on the EPA database about toxic emissions by companies).
214. Hirsch, supra note 213, at 8; Jonathan Remy Nash, FramingEffects and Regulatory Choice,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 320 (2006) (explaining command-and-control regulatory
approach in the environmental context as a government setting a particular standard with
which targeted actors are required to comply).
215. Hirsch, supra note 213, at 8.
216. See generally American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009) (describing the program).
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engage. Rather, they set a regulatory "cap" for pollution levels that may be
emitted by all industries within the scope of the scheme. 217 Under that
"cap," such laws permit individual market players to decide for themselves
2 18
what activities they will engage in so as not to exceed the allowable cap.
Further, while cap-and-trade laws set maximum pollution levels for
particular industries, they allow individual firms within those regulated
industries to trade pollution entitlements amongst themselves so long as the
industry as a whole does not exceed its maximum pollution level. 219 The
analogy between privacy regulation and environmental regulation is not
perfect in this respect. Environmental regulation attempts to cap the
maximum pollution in the environment for a given industry during a given
period of time. Privacy regulation, on the other hand, could not realistically
set a minimum "floor" for privacy regulation and allow some businesses to
create more privacy protections than the floor requires while others are
entitled to provide less protection. In the privacy area, the goal obviously
would not be an overall floor for privacy protection which some businesses
could exceed and others would not meet-while trading rights to infringe
privacy.

217. See Stephanie L. Wilson, Dog Days of Climate Change: Heating the Debate for Federal Capand-Trade, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 163, 165 (2008) (describing the "cap" as "a

mandatory limit on emissions from a group of polluters, such as power plants, to a level lower
than current emissions").

218.

See id. at 166 (discussing how industries respond to cap and trade). Wilson states:
In a perfect situation, regulators' [sic] would know exactly how much it would cost
each facility to reduce emissions and would be free to classify among sources based
on cost considerations. This would allow regulators to set emissions limits for each
facility at the level that enables the overall target to be accomplished at minimum
cost. In reality, this information is unknown. A cap-and-trade program overcomes
this problem by letting the market generate the configuration of emissions levels
across facilities.

Id. (emphasis omitted).

219.

See id. at 165-66 (explaining how industries trade allowances). Wilson states:
Industries covered by the cap-and-trade program can buy and sell allowances from
other entities also covered by the program. A facility will buy additional allowances
if the price of the allowances is less than it costs to meet the required reduction.
Conversely, a facility will sell allowances if they could reduce emissions more
cheaply without the use of additional allowances, generating a profit. The cost of
cutting emissions to meet the allowance limits is not the same for each regulated
entity. Some plants may have more efficiently run operations, so the trading aspect
of a cap-and-trade program offers economically advantageous results that cannot
be matched in a mandatory scheme where all are obligated to meet the
requirement no matter what the cost.
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However, environmental-regulation approaches could be adapted to
online privacy 220 by using legal rules to foster the development of market
forces that promote the privacy goals society would ideally desire online.
Rather than setting overall floors for privacy protection, laws could, in the
privacy context, establish best practices for OSNs that focus on protecting
and enforcing individual privacy by mandating the enforcement and
adoption of terms of use and privacy policies and incorporation of privacyenhancing technologies into OSN services.22 1 Thus, the law could be used to
encourage market solutions to be developed that meet, and over time
hopefully exceed, the best practices, as OSNs continue to compete with each
other in the marketplace for customers. This approach involves a complex
interplay of social norms, laws, market forces, and system architecture to
achieve desired privacy outcomes.
4.

Privacy and Publicity Torts

Privacy torts seem to be the most obvious legal approach for online
privacy. However, as currently framed, these torts have significant
limitations, most of which are identified above. 222 The Restatement
223
(Second) of Torts currently recognizes four distinct privacy torts.
Unfortunately, they are not comprehensive in terms of coverage and are
criticized by free-speech advocates.2 24 Nevertheless, some of the privacy torts
could be modified to better accommodate the realities of online conduct
involving video content. Professor Abril has suggested strengthening the tort
of public disclosure of private facts2 2 5 so that it operates more effectively in
220. Hirsch, supra note 213, at 23 ("The privacy injuries of the Information Age are
structurally similar to the environmental damage of the smokestack era. Two key concepts that
have been used to understand environmental damage-the 'negative externality' and the
'tragedy of the commons'-also shed light on privacy injuries."); id. at 63 (identifying other
similarities between environmental regulation and information regulation, including the fact
that market players regulated by both areas of law "undergo rapid change, face stiff
competition, and have the capacity for socially beneficial innovation").
221. The kinds of technologies that legislation might impose on OSN services in this
respect are taken up in more detail infra Part IV.A.6.
222. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing limitations such as the inapplicability of tort laws when
the subject of a photo or video originally consented, in peer contexts, and when there is no
commercial profit motive).
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (1997). The four torts are: (1) intrusion
into seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light publicity; and (4)
misappropriation. Id.
224. See generally Volokh, supra note 136 (suggesting that tortious approaches to protecting
privacy cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment, but that contractual approaches may
avoid this criticism); Zimmerman, supra note 136 (suggesting that torts prohibiting true speech
cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment).
225. See RESTATEMENT, (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) ("One who gives publicity to a
matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if the matter publicized ... (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.").
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the OSN context. 226 She notes that the public-disclosure tort developed at a
time when the law was concerned with intrusions into physical spaces. 227 It is
therefore not well suited to virtual environments. 22 8 She, therefore, suggests
refocusing inquiries about public-versus-private activities to better meet the
needs of the information society. Notably, she advocates the following: (1)
thinking about zones of confidentiality created by system architecture,
agreements, and relationship bonds, rather than physical walls; 229 (2)
categorizing privacy harms that ensue from information disclosure rather
than categorizing certain subject matter as per se private;230 and (3)
thinking in terms of overall accessibility to online information rather than
23 1
whether online information was completely secret or secluded.
Related to the privacy torts is the right-of-publicity tort, which closely
tracks the privacy tort of misappropriation. 232 Both the right-of-publicity tort
and the misappropriation tort prevent the use of someone else's name or
likeness for financial benefit.233 Neither tort, however, effectively covers

unauthorized posting and dissemination of photographs on OSNs because
most of that conduct is not for commercial gain but merely for amusement
and discussion. 234 The misappropriation-based torts might be expanded to
help individuals control use and dissemination of their images online. 23 5 For
example, the torts could be extended to cover unauthorized disseminations
of an individual's image even in the absence of a profit motive. Of course,
there would have to be some counterbalancing forces in place to ensure that
speech was not unnecessarily chilled. For example, a broadened,
226.

Abril, supra note 64, at 28.

227. Id. at 2 ("[Pjrivacy is usually a function of the physical space in which the purportedly
private activity occurred."); id. at 3 ("Traditionally, privacy has been inextricably linked to
physical space.").
228. See id. at 4 (explaining that concepts of physical space are no longer relevant in
analyzing modern online privacy harms).
229. Id. at 47.
230. Id.
231. Abril, supra note 64, at 47.
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) ("One who appropriates to his
own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy.").
233. See 1 LALONDE, GREEN & GILSON, supra note 61, § 2B.01 ("The right of publicity is the
right of [an individual] to control the commercial use of his or her name, visual likeness,
signature symbol, or other personal characteristics."); see also MILLs, supra note 28, at 173-77
(discussing technical differences between the privacy-misappropriation tort and the right-ofpublicity tort).

234. See SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 187 ("The appropriation tort would rarely apply to the
discussion on the Internet of people's private lives or the posting of their photos."). Of course,
it is arguable that the OSN provider's complicity in the posting might amount to financial-profit
motives if the OSN provider is deriving financial profit from advertising related to the online
posting of video content. This proposition remains to be tested.
235. See id. ("The appropriation tort might be expanded to encompass a broader set of
problematic uses of information about a person . . ").
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noncommercial appropriation tort might apply online only "when people's
2 36
photos are used in ways that are not of public concern."
The four American privacy torts also suffer from some common
limitations. They place plaintiffs in the awkward position of having to relive
the humiliating and embarrassing images, which are entered into the public
record as part of the court proceedings. 237 To add insult to injury, the
plaintiff will have to pay a lawyer for the privilege of reliving this
embarrassment. Additionally, domestic laws raise jurisdictional difficulties
online that do not similarly arise with technological solutions or contracts
that specify choice of forum and choice of law.23 8 These limitations apply
equally to the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress tort.239 Even if this
tort was reworked to allow lesser or different notions of distress to state a
claim, it would still not be an ideal approach for protecting an individual
plaintiff against the humiliation and embarrassment of the information
disclosures during judicial proceedings. Unless we move to a more
European approach to privacy litigation to allow plaintiffs to hide their
identities when suing, 24° these torts will have limited appeal in practice. Even
then, the cost and jurisdictional barriers may be insurmountable for many
2 41
people.
5.

Privacy Contracts and Breach-of-Confidence Actions

Express or implied contracts and breach-of-confidence actions might
also provide greater protection in the video-privacy context. Contracts and
breach of confidence are treated together because they all rely on
relationships.242 Express or implied contracts arise from parties' conduct and
their intention to enter into legally binding obligations. Breach-ofconfidence actions can arise from contract law or can be imposed externally

236.

Id.
237.
MILLS, supra note 28, at 53-54 (describing additional privacy problems raised by the
availability of court records on the Internet); see also Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd,
[2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [2008] E.M.L.R. 20, [230] (Eng.) ("[O]nce privacy has been

infringed, the damage is done and the embarrassment is only augmented by pursuing a court
action.").
238. Such contracts are generally upheld in the online context. See, e.g., Caspi v. Microsoft
Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (finding ISP forum-

selection clause enforceable).
239.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).

240. SOLOVE, supranote 3, at 120 ("[C] ourts in many European countries are more willing
to allow people to conceal their identities when suing, thus protecting plaintiffs from bringing
more attention to the gossip they are trying to stop."); id. at 121 ("More people should be
allowed to sue without having their real names appear in the record. This would allow people to
seek a remedy for the spread of information about them without having to increase the
exposure of the information.").
241. Mosley, [2008] E.M.L.R. 20, [230] ("Claimants with the degree of resolve (and financial
resources) of Mr Max Mosley are likely to be few and far between.").
242. See Lipton, supra note 127 (making this argument).
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to protect a relationship that the law deems to require a high duty of
confidentiality. Relationships on which the law imposes duties of
confidentiality include the doctor-patient relationship and the preacherpenitent relationship. 243 Relationships that give rise to legal obligations of
confidence can be useful models for privacy regulation. 244 However, peerbased video-privacy incursions do not generally involve relationships that the
law regards as involving legal obligations of confidence. Of course, it is
possible to expand the categories of confidential relationships recognized by
the law. The question would be how best to expand these categories.
a.

Express and Implied Contracts

Express contracts of confidentiality might be problematic in protecting
online-video privacy. It is unlikely that private individuals taking pictures of
each other and posting them online have the time, inclination, or
experience to enter into contracts to protect each other's privacy. However,
implied contracts may be a viable alternative. Implied and express contracts
can be utilized in the context of interpersonal relationships to ensure the
legal enforcement of privacy and confidentiality expectations online. 245 For
instance, Professors Abril and Cava suggest that an express promise of
confidentiality between private individuals in respect of health-care
information could be built into online health-care architectures. 246 Professor
243. SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 214 (giving examples of relationships of confidence
protected by legal rules, including attorney-client, priest-penitent, husband-wife, and

psychotherapist-patient).
244. As early as 1968, for example, Professor Charles Fried noted the importance of
focusing on privacy expectations within personal relationships. Fried, supra note 142, at 482
("In general it is my thesis that in developed social contexts love, friendship and trust are only
possible if persons enjoy and accord to each other a certain measure of privacy.").
245. See Abril & Cava, supra note 18, at 268. Abril and Cava explained:
Online, express confidentiality agreements are a more tenable solution. Facilitated
through available technology, confidentiality agreements between users could

assure a higher level of protection for those sharing private and personal
information. In some instances, confidentiality agreements have been offered
through online health ISPs as a prerequisite to membership. PatientsLikeMe.com
includes such a clause as part of its terms of use. It states: "You agree not to disclose
to any person or entity personally identifiable information about other members
that you learn using this Site (whether posted in the Member Area by a member or
emailed to you by a member) without the express consent of such member. You
may disclose information of a general nature (that could not identify the member
who provided such information or whom such information is about) to third
parties outside this Site, subject to the above restriction on non-commercial use."
Id. (citation omitted).
246. Id. at 276. Abril and Cava explained:
Cyber-patients have the duty of confidentiality to fellow patients. All information
disclosed on health networking websites is privy and not to be divulged or
otherwise disseminated. Users should not disclose any information obtained
through the website unless specifically authorized. Similarly, disclosing cyber-
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McClurg, moreover, suggests recognizing
implied contracts
of
confidentiality for intimate relationships generally. 24 7 His suggestion
contemplates protection for both textual information shared in confidence
and for video information pertaining to the relationship. 248 These ideas
could be extended to social relationships more broadly.
Professor Volokh suggests that express or implied contracts of
confidentiality are the only legal method of avoiding First Amendment
problems. 249 However, he identifies two important limitations on contractbased solutions that may have particular resonance in cyberspace. First,
contractual enforcement generally does not apply to third parties unless, for
example, the third party is an agent of one of the contracting parties. 250 In
the OSN situation, people disseminating one another's images online may
not be in any kind of relationship with the subject of the image, let alone a
contractual relationship. Second, contracts cannot be enforced against
minors. 251 This may be a significant problem in the OSN context because
many people sharing images online are minors.
b.

Breach of Confidence

Some commentators have suggested the extension of breach-ofconfidence actions to better protect privacy. 252 For example, British law
currently protects a greater array of relationships of confidence than does

patients should be as clear as possible regarding the level of confidentiality they
expect. Cyber-patients have the duty to obtain the consent of family members and
others whose health information they disclose. Relevant information regarding the
health of family members is a vital part of a complete medical record. However,
cyber-patients must understand these individuals also have rights to privacy in their
health information. Cyber-patients must, therefore, obtain the informed consent of
their family members before posting such information on the website.
Id.
247. McClurg, supra note 12, at 888.
248. Id. at 887-88 (giving examples of online text-based and video disseminations of
confidential information).
249. Volokh, supra note 136, at 1062. Volokh explains:
I certainly do not claim that a contractual approach to information privacy, even
with a large dollop of implied contract, is a panacea for information privacy
advocates.... I claim only that contractual solutions are a constitutional alternative
and may be the only constitutional alternative, not that they are always a
particularly satisfactory alternative.
Id.; Zimmerman, supra note 136, at 362-63 (suggesting looking into contractual solutions for
protecting privacy rather than tort law).
250. Volokh, supra note 136, at 1061.
251.
Id. at 1063.
252. See Richards & Solove, supra note 40, at 182 (arguing that confidentiality is an integral
aspect of privacy that only breach-of-confidence actions can adequately protect).
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American law. 253 In fact, a British court recently held that no formal
relationship between parties is required to ground a breach-of-confidence
action. 254 American tort law could be extended to cover a greater array of
relationships of confidence, particularly online.255 Such an approach may be
less objectionable on First Amendment grounds than reliance on extending
privacy torts because rights arising from relationships are not enforceable
against the whole world. 256 Of course, one limitation to the breach-of-

confidence approach is that even a broadened concept of relationships of
confidence will not cover situations such as dog-poop girl and Bus Uncle
where no relationship exists between the image taker and the image subject,
other than that they happen to be sharing a mode of public transportation.
6.

Legislating Codes of Conduct and Technical Standards

Legal rules might also enhance privacy by encouraging the adoption of
certain social behaviors and technical standards. 257 This approach focuses
on legislating "best practices" to encourage either markets or individuals, or
both, to behave in a particular way to better protect online privacy.
Legislation might be targeted at OSNs with respect to best practices for
default privacy settings. 258 This might involve requiring OSNs to incorporate
technological privacy protections by default, such as refusing access by one
user to another's information without asking the second user a series of

253. SOLOVE, supra note 40, at 137 ("England, which rejects Warren and Brandeis's privacy
torts, recognizes a breach-of-confidence tort. Unlike the American version, which applies only
in a few narrow contexts, the English tort applies much more generally and extends even to
spouses and lovers."); Richards & Solove, supra note 40, at 158-60.
254. Campbell v. MGN Ltd [20041 UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, 464-65 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.). The House of Lords explained:
[The breach of confidence] cause of action has now firmly shaken off the limiting
constraint of the need for an initial confidential relationship.... Now the law
imposes a 'duty of confidence' whenever a person receives information he knows
or ought to know is fairly and reasonably to be regarded as confidential.
Id.
255. See Lipton, supra note 127 (discussing the changing relationships between the parties
involved in privacy-threatening conduct).
256. Richards & Solove, supra note 40, at 178-81.
257. This is an extension of the idea of drawing on the environmental-regulation model to
encourage markets, and in this case individuals as well, to behave in a particular way.
258. Edwards & Brown, supra note 182, at 224 (describing how the Directive on Privacy and
Electronic Communications in the European Union could be used to promote default privacy
settings (citing Council Directive 2002/58, Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC), availableat http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/
dat/2002/l_201/ 20120020731en00370047.pdf)). Professors Edwards and Brown suggest that
legislating mandatory privacy default settings may prove more effective in protecting individual
privacy than leaving the market to its own devices. Id.
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security questions and having her check a permission screen. 259 As another
example, legislatures could require OSNs to design their systems to prevent
copying and pasting of digital information and images unless a particular
26
user opted to allow her images to be copied by others. 0
Legal rules do not only shape behavior through enforcement or the
threat of enforcement. They also serve a communicative function about
appropriate online conduct.2 61 They can thus reflect, and in some cases even
direct, the development of social norms.262 In the video-privacy context, law
will be an important piece of the regulatory matrix both by punishing
inappropriate behaviors, and by signaling the contours of acceptable
behaviors. However, law cannot operate in a vacuum. The following
discussion considers the other five regulatory modalities that must interact
263
with legal rules to successfully achieve an effective regulatory matrix.
B.

SOCIAL NORMS

Social norms are an extremely important form of regulation. 264 Norms
may be defined as rules that are "diffusely enforced by third parties other
than state agents by means of social sanctions." 265 Norms can be more
significant than laws, 266 particularly in areas that involve high levels of social
interaction, 267 like privacy. The problem with cyberspace, at least in its Web

259. This is effectively what many closed networks do now. Facebook, for example, does not
let a user access another's profile unless the second user accepts the first as a "friend."
260. Of course, for privacy-protection purposes, this would require permission of the image
subject as well as potentially the image owner, which could be unwieldy in practice.
261. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 404 (2009) (discussing the "expressive role" law could play
in the area of cyber gender harassment); Fried, supra note 142, at 493 ("By using the public,
impersonal and ultimate institution of law to grant persons this control, we at once put the
right to control as far beyond question as we can and at the same time show how seriously we
take that right.").
262. Lee Tien, Cheap Surveillance,Essential Facilities, and Privacy Norms, 1999 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. VS 10 1 7, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Symposia/Privacy/99VS 10/
fsarticle.htm ("Because of its power, government generally can affect social norms.").
263. Of course, there are some more "foundational" things that law can do that are not
discussed here because they are not likely to take hold in the United States. The obvious
example is an express constitutional guarantee of privacy, such as that adopted in Europe
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
264. SOLOVE, supra note 40, at 93 ("One of the primary ways that society intervenes in
people's lives is through the enforcement of norms.").
265. Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspectivefrom the Legal Academy, in
SOCIAL NoR.Ms 35, 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001); see also Lessig, supra
note 166, at 62 ("[Norms] are different from law-they are enforced.., not by the state, but by
the sanctions of other members of a particular community. But they are nonetheless a source of
constraint, functioning to protect privacy.").
266. Strandburg, supranote 33, at 1248.
267. Id.
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2.0 iteration, 268 is that many norms are not yet well developed. Particularly
in relation to OSNs, norm development is in its infancy because of the
relative novelty of social-networking technology. This state of affairs has both
advantages and disadvantages for privacy advocates. One advantage is the
ability to make privacy-protecting regulatory decisions before privacydestroying norms become entrenched. However, one disadvantage is the
difficulty of ascertaining appropriate levels of privacy protection in the
absence of clearer information about social expectations. This paradox is
not new in the online-privacy context. 269 However, it requires serious
thought by decision-makers before potentially harmful norms become
entrenched.270

Lee Tien has suggested the possibility of a "critical mass model" of
norm evolution. 271 This model involves observing the number of people who
behave in a particular way, along with the number of people who share
common knowledge of the norm. 272 He suggests that this critical-mass
model is more easily satisfied with face-to-face interactions 273 because face274
to-face interactions generally involve information symmetry and feedback.
In situations where behavior is less visible, common knowledge may not
easily develop, so norms equally do not develop. 275 Thus, following Tien's
model, it is possible that in the OSN context, it will be very difficult to
develop and identify social norms, and it may, in fact, take longer than we
expect to identify the "well-traveled path" 276 of acceptable online behavior
about privacy.
Globalization also exacerbates difficulties in identifying and enforcing
norms online. Are we talking about one global society's norms? Or rather an
overlapping group of online societies, like the overlapping networks of
"friends" on an OSN? Another barrier to identifying privacy norms online
relates to the ambiguity or cognitive disconnect that arises when people are
surveyed about online privacy. In the few surveys that have been conducted
on attitudes to online privacy, respondents generally rate the idea of privacy

268. LowE, supra note 7, at 294 ("Web 2.0 [is a] term used to describe an evolving
generation of a participatory Web [and] the proliferation of interconnectivity and social
interaction on the World Wide Web.").
269. See Bernstein, supra note 30, at 932-33 (describing similar dynamics with respect to
commercial transactions on the Internet and data aggregation by Internet commerce
companies).
270. Id. at 946-49.
271. Tien, supra note 262, at 1 17.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Tien, supra note 262, at 17.
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in the abstract very highly. 277 However, they are prepared to bargain with
their privacy for a very small price. 278 An online-shopping coupon may well
entice an individual to disclose voluminous personal detail with little regard
279
to future uses of that information.
So how do we identify and enforce social norms as they relate to
content, particularly video content, shared over OSNs? Some empirical work
may be helpful, however, empirical work is limited because individuals
typically undervalue their personal information. 280 There is an argument
that empirical work may suffer less from the undervaluation problem in the
OSN context than in the textual-data-aggregation context. In the textualdata-aggregation context, which has been more intensively surveyed,
consumers' abstract expectations of privacy are often not aligned with their
behavior when faced with the choice of trading their information for some
commercial benefit, such as online-shopping coupons or frequent-flyer
miles. In the online-video context, on the other hand, there is little prospect
of individuals bargaining with their personal information for any
commercial benefit because their transactions are generally social rather
than commercial. Thus, self-reported survey results about privacy
expectations in OSNs may be more appropriately aligned with the way
281
people actually behave.
Another possible method of identifying privacy norms online is to
consider blog postings and associated comments that deal with privacy

277. SOLOVE, supra note 40, at 73 (citing the work of economists Alessandro Acquisti and
Jens Grossklags); Eric Goldman, On My Mind: The Privacy Hoax, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 42.
Goldman stated,
But what do these surveys really prove? Consumers may tell survey takers they fear
for their privacy, but their behavior belies it. People don't read privacy policies, for
example. In a survey taken last year by the Privacy Leadership Initiative, a group of
corporate and trade association executives, only 3% of consumers read privacy
policies carefully, and 64% only glanced at--or never read-privacy policies.
Id.
278. SOLOVE, supranote 40, at 73.
279. See SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 85-86; see also id. at 87 ("Since people routinely give out
their personal information for shopping discount cards, for access to websites, and even for
free, some market proponents (especially the self-regulators) argue that the value of the data is
very low to the individuals."); Froomkin, supra note 137, at 1502 ("[Clonsumers suffer from
privacy myopia: they will sell their data too often and too cheaply. Modest assumptions about
consumer privacy myopia suggest that even Americans who place a high value on information
privacy will sell their privacy bit by bit for frequent flyer miles."). There are other alternative
explanations for consumers failing to act in privacy-protecting ways online. Bernstein, supra
note 128, at 290 (suggesting that consumers are actually unaware of the extent of privacy
threats online, which leads them to fail to adequately protect their privacy using alreadyavailable technological tools and social behaviors).
280. SOLOVE, supranote 16, at 87; Froomkin, supranote 137, at 1502.
281. See generally Levin & Abril, supra note 114 (surveying college students about attitudes to
online privacy involving OSNs).
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issues. Increasingly, online privacy incursions are reported on blogs, and
various individuals comment about related expectations of privacy. 282 A
comprehensive survey of some of these postings may illuminate prevailing
societal views about privacy and identify areas in which norms are still
developing. Such a survey may alleviate concerns regarding individuals'
283
ability to identify norms outside the context of face-to-face interactions.
If it is possible to ascertain any social expectations about online privacy
in the OSN context, these could be usefully reduced to Internet guidelines,
akin to the way netiquette developed in the early days of the Internet.
Netiquette is "the growing body of acceptable, though as yet largely
unwritten, etiquette with respect to conduct by users of the Internet."284 In
the Internet's early days, netiquette generally referred to attempts to
articulate appropriate social norms with respect to the new e-mail
28 5
technologies available at the time.
Private organizations or individuals with a stake in the future operation
of OSNs might encourage the articulation of netiquette principles for OSNs
that take privacy into account. Indeed, many OSN service providers
currently incorporate privacy provisions into their terms of use. 286 However,
problems exist with enforcement of these terms generally and with the fact
that many victims of privacy incursions are not parties to these contracts.
Some OSNs have privacy policies that resemble attempts to articulate new
forms of netiquette. 287 These are generally available statements of best
practices by an OSN provider about its aspirations to appropriately protect
user privacy. 288 However, terms of use and privacy policies differ from
netiquette and social norms because terms-of-use and privacy policies are
generally written from an OSN provider's point of view-not the individual
user's point of view. Thus, they focus on what the service provider will or will
not do with personal information, rather than the kind of respect individual
users should pay to each other's privacy. Emerging online norms, or

282. See, e.g., Posting of Owen Thomas to Valleywag, http://valleywag.gawker.com/321802/
bank-intern-busted-by-facebook (Nov. 12, 2007, 05:06 PM) (providing an example of an
employer finding an image on Facebook of an employee at a Halloween party on a day when
the employee was allegedly out of the office for a family emergency).
283.

Tien, supra note 262,

17.

284.

1267623 Ontario Inc. v. Nexx Online, Inc., No. C20546/99, 1999 O.T.C. LEXIS 1670,
*4 (Ont. Super. Ct.June 14, 1999) (Can.).
285. In 1995, for example, Intel promulgated a set of guidelines in the form of a generally
available memo for the Internet community. These "Netiquette Guidelines" contained
suggestions about appropriate use of email services for the then-new generation of Internet
users who had not "'grown up' with the Internet." Memorandum from Sally Hambridge, Intel
Corp., Netiquette Guidelines (Oct. 1995), http://www.albury.net.au/new-users/rfc1855.txt.
286.
See supra Part II.B (listing YouTube, Flickr, Facebook, and Yahoo! as websites that
provide privacy policies in their terms of use).
287.

See, e.g., Facebook, supra note 98 (describing Facebook's privacy policy).

288.

Id.
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netiquette, must take account of both the appropriate behavior of OSN
providers vis-A-vis private individuals and the appropriate behavior of
289
individuals amongst themselves.
Some OSNs attempt to outline a form of netiquette, describing ways in
which users of their services should treat each other. YouTube and Flickr
each have a set of "Community Guidelines." 290 The Community Guidelines
cover issues like ensuring that no inappropriate content is posted and
remembering that children may be looking at information and video files.
They also include terms like, "Flickr is not a venue for you to harass, abuse,
impersonate, or intimidate others. If we receive a valid complaint about your
conduct, we'll send you a warning or terminate your account." 291 Flickr also
includes the simple suggestion: "Don't be creepy." 292 The guidelines do not
say anything about protecting others' privacy rights, although they do talk
293
about respecting others' copyrights.
289. Intel's Netiquette Guidelines focus on behavior amongst individuals using text-based
electronic communications services, while at the same time acknowledging the role of service
providers in the behavioral equation. Intel's Netiquette Guidelines state:
Individuals should be aware that no matter who supplies their Internet access, be it
an Internet Service Provider through a private account, or a student account at a
University, or an account through a corporation, that those organizations have
regulations about ownership of mail and files, about what is proper to post or send,
and how to present yourself. Be sure to check with the local authority for specific
guidelines.
Memorandum from Sally Hambridge, supra note 285, § 1.0. The memo also warns: "Remember
that all these services belong to someone else. The people who pay the bills get to make the
rules governing usage. Information may be free-or it may not be! Be sure you check." Id.
§ 4.1.1.
290.
Flickr, Flickr Community Guidelines, http://www.flickr.com/guidelines.gue (last
visited Feb. 18, 2010). In fact, Flickr expresses that its Community Guidelines are part of its
terms of use so they may have contractual force in addition to reflecting desired social norms.
Id. ("Don't forget that your use of Flickr is subject to these Guidelines and our Terms of Use.");
see also YouTube, YouTube Community Guidelines, http://www.youtube.com/t/community_
guidelines (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) ("We Enforce These Guidelines").
291.

Flickr, supra note 290.

292.

Id.

293.
Id. In particular, Flickr suggests ways of amicably resolving copyright disputes by
encouraging a complainant to privately contact the alleged copyright violator. If that does not
succeed, then the complainant is requested to file a notice of infringement with the "Yahoo!
Copyright Team" who will resolve the matter. Their Community Guidelines state that:
If you see photos or videos that you've created in another member's photostream,
don't panic. This is probably just a misunderstanding and not malicious. A good
first step is to contact them and politely ask them to remove it. If that doesn't work,
please file a Notice of Infringement with the Yahoo! Copyright Team who will take
it from there. You may be tempted to post an entry on your photostream or in our
public forum about what's happening, but that's not the best way to resolve a
possible copyright problem. WAedon't encourage singling out individuals like this
on Flickr.
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Flickr's Community Guidelines also ask users of the service not to
"upload anything that isn't [theirs]." 294 However, closer inspection of the
relevant clause suggests that this is geared towards copyright protection
rather than privacy protection. The definition of "stuff that isn't yours" states
that: "This includes other people's photos, video and/or stuff you've
collected from around the Internet. ' 295 The possessive pronoun here relates
to "photos, videos and other stuff," suggesting that it is the ownership of a
digital image that is important to Flickr, rather than the holder of privacy
interests in the image. In other words, where the photographer is a different
person than the photographic subject, it appears that Flickr's guidelines
contemplate protection of only the photographer's rights in the image, not
296
the privacy interests of the photographic subject.
In contrast to services like Flickr and YouTube, some of the closed
networks like MySpace and Facebook do not have specific sets of community
guidelines outside of their standard terms of use and privacy policies. This
may be because their users are automatically regarded as having more
control over content because of the closed nature of the network. Thus,
297
there is less perceived need to promulgate a set of community guidelines.
In other words, if users are able to limit views of their content to "friends"
authorized to access their profiles, then there is less need for the service
provider to promulgate a set of rules about how community members

294. Id.
295. Id.
296. YouTube's community guidelines similarly protect copyright, but do not specifically
mention privacy interests. YouTube, supra note 291. The YouTube Community Guidelines state:
Respect copyright. Only upload videos that you made or that you are authorized to
use. This means don't upload videos you didn't make, or use content in your
videos that someone else owns the copyright to, such as music tracks, snippets of
copyrighted programs, or videos made by other users, without necessary
authorizations. Read our Copyright Tips for more information.
Id.
297. This assertion may find support in the fact that one of the most "open" networks,
Wikipedia, has an extremely detailed set of guidelines referred to as "Wikiquette" to assist
people posting information to behave appropriately vis-A-vis other posters. See Wikipedia,
Wikipedia: Etiquette, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Etiquette (last visited Feb. 18,
2010); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 155

(2006) (describing Wikipedia's guidelines). Sunstein stated:
When active debates are occurring about the content of articles, it is necessary to
have good norms to provide some discipline. The term "Wikiquette" refers to the
etiquette that Wikipedians follow. Wikiquette helps to ensure that the active
debates are transferred to separate "talk pages." These are the deliberative forums
on Wikipedia, in which those who disagree explain the basis for their
disagreement. What is noteworthy is that the articles themselves are (mosty) solid,
and that partisan debates have a specifically designed location.
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should treat each other. Community members can rely on the technical
298
defaults they set to limit uses others may make of their information.
Of course, this is only true to a point, but it may explain the difference
between open and closed networks in terms of the perceived need to
articulate community guidelines. 299 Paradoxically, users of closed OSNs such
as Facebook may be particularly vulnerable to the public's unbridled
dissemination of their personal information and images due to developing
norms against rejecting requests from people who want to "friend" you
online.300 Norms also appear to be developing that you cannot "unfriend"
someone once you have accepted them as a friend. 30 1 Thus, a Facebook
user's apparent control over who accesses their information may be much
more illusory than it appears.
Outside the OSN context, the "spoiler" communities that investigate
likely outcomes of reality television shows provide some useful examples of
emerging online norms about privacy. For example, online communities
that privately investigate likely contestants and outcomes on the popular
Survivor television series3 0 2 try to ascertain the identities of contestants on
upcoming series, the locations in which producers will film the series, and
the order in which contestants will vote their counterparts off the
program.30 3 Of course, attempts to investigate the lives of actual contestants
tread a fine line between legitimate fan interest in the program and invading
the privacy of the contestants. 30 4 One norm that has developed within the
Survivor spoiler community is the use of "brain trusts." 30 5 These are small
subsets of the spoiler community who conduct much of the detailed
investigation of contestants through encrypted websites that are not

298. ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 226 ("Facebook, for example, offers tools to label the
photographs one submits and to indicate what groups of people can and cannot see them.").
299. Norms may also play a part in this distinction. Those posting to YouTube may expect
public availability of content, while those posting in closed networks expect more privacy
protections.
300. CORY DocTOROW, CONTENT 183 (2008) ("It's socially awkward to refuse to add
someone to your friends list-but removing someone from your friends list is practically a
declaration of war."); Grimmelmann, supra note 107, at 1175 ("[I]t's hard to say no to a contact
request.").
301.
DOCTOROW, supra note 300, at 183; Grimmelmann, supra note 107, at 1175 (noting
that it's equally as hard to remove contacts as to refuse contacts). But see Wilson, supra note 111
(noting that people are increasingly suffering from Facebook fatigue and are beginning to "defriend" or "de-follow" their online contacts).
302.

See HENRYJENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE 25

(2006) (describing Survivor as a popular CBS show that started the reality-television trend).
303. Id. at 25-26.
304. Id. at 36-37 ("[T]here is a thin, thin line here between investigating those who have
chosen to insert themselves into the public spotlight and stalking them at their home or
workplace.... The community spends a great deal of time debating, exactly where you draw the
line.").
305. Id. at 38.
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accessible to the general online community. 30 6 Part of the aim here is to
protect the privacy of the contestants, as well as to ensure a higher degree of
30 7
accuracy once the brain trust posts its findings to the general community.
The community's use of encryption technology to protect discussions
implicating contestants' privacy suggests an intriguing interplay between
developing privacy norms and system architecture.
All of these examples demonstrate ways in which online communities
are beginning to develop and recognize privacy norms, including norms
relating to video files. Thus, it may be time for users to take stock of videoprivacy norms, and to attempt to ascertain where laws, technologies, and
market practices are lagging behind community expectations of privacy. For
30 8
example, there currently appear to be no prevailing rules about "tagging"
photographs to make them more easily searchable. 3 °9 Salient issues about
appropriate regulation include whether any identifiable norms exist relating
to the impact tagging might have on individual privacy. Even if an individual
consents to the posting of her image on Facebook and acknowledges the
possibility that others may see and copy it, does that necessarily mean that
she consents to tagging, which enables easier and potentially larger-scale
searching and copying of the image?310 It would be interesting to find out
how OSN users feel about this issue.3 1 1 Norms could then be calibrated with
legal rules that encourage best practices in technologies, online contracting,
and other market and social practices.

306. Id.
307. JENKINS, supra note 302, at 38 ("The brain trusts ... argue that this closed-door vetting
process protects privacy and ensures a high degree of accuracy once they do post their
findings.").
308. PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 28, at 201 ("Tags are essentially keywords that are
associated with a piece of information-for example, a photo, blog post, or video-in a
keyword-based classification scheme. Tagging, in other words, is like creating a label for online
content.").
309. See Edwards & Brown, supra note 182, at 212-15 (describing the role of "tagging" in
the loss of control of personal data to third parties).
310. Of course, tagging also potentially assists with searching and removal of content where
an image subject might have objected to its online dissemination. Thus, the technology cuts
both ways here.
311.
Professor Zittrain has noted that tagging may only be the beginning of the problem
for online-image privacy as facial-recognition software becomes more sophisticated and video
images can now be matched quite easily with tagged text descriptions. Zr'RAIN, supranote 2, at
214. Zittrain warns:
Web sites like Riya, Polar Rose, and MyHeritage are perfecting facial recognition
technologies so that once photos of a particular person are tagged a few times with
his or her name, their computers can then automatically label all future photos
that include the person-even if their image appears in the background.
Id.; see also PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 28, at 44 ("New, convenient services that aggregate
photos and allow for image searching, with increasing amounts of metadata to help associate
the images with people come online every year.").
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Another example where norms are not clearly developed, or at least
well recognized, relates to the amount of responsibility placed on individuals
to actively protect their own information online and to avoid being masters
of their own doom in terms of privacy.3 12 While this Article focuses on
developing appropriate respect for individual privacy online in the OSN
context, it is important to remember that information subjects should also
take some responsibility for the protection of their own personal
information, such as implementing appropriate privacy controls on closed
networks like Facebook and MySpace.
C.

MARKET FORCES

Market forces often go hand in hand with social norms. Social desires
and expectations dictate, to a certain extent, what the market is able to sell
and, perhaps cyclically, the market can dictate social norms through the
nature of its products and services. 313 If all market players provide products
that are limited to a given subset of possible social behaviors, then social
behaviors will, by default, have to conform to what is available in the market.
However, if consumers are not happy with the available choices, they may
either refuse to buy a service at all, or they may petition the service provider
to change the service to better conform to their expectations. The
immediate user backlash against Facebook's "Beacon" advertising scheme,
launched in late 2007, is an example of consumers demanding changes to
314
an online service to better suit their privacy expectations.

312. Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd, [20081 EWHC (QB) 1777, [2008] E.M.L.R. 20,
[226] (Eng.). The court held:
[C]laimant's behaviour was reckless and almost self-destructive. This does not
excuse the intrusion into his privacy but it might be a relevant factor to take into
account when assessing causal responsibility for what happened. It could be
thought unreasonable to absolve him of all responsibility for placing himself and
his family in the predicament in which they now find themselves. It is part and
parcel of human dignity that one must take at least some responsibility for one's
own actions.

Id.
313.
This is not unlike the way law can communicate norms. However, law can also enforce
norms. The interplay between modes of regulation can be quite complex and paradoxical at
times.

314. The Beacon program involved divulging to a user's "friends" what products the user
had bought online on the premise that the user's friends may be interested in similar product.
See SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 80 (citing various examples of online service providers canceling
initiatives due to public outcry about privacy, including Yahoo! eliminating a reverse telephonenumber search from its People Search site); Grimmelmann, supra note 107, at 1147-48
(describing problems with the Beacon program); Posting of William McGeveran to Info/Law,
Facebook Retreats Somewhat on Beacon Policy, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2007/
12/02/facebook-retreats-socialads/ (Dec. 2, 2007) (describing a change that Facebook made to
its Beacon program in response to a user protest).
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Commentators have been skeptical about the inclination of markets to
regulate online privacy.3 15 The Internet allows market players to make gains
from individuals' personal information with very little legal recourse
available for loss of privacy. Where are the incentives for market players to
protect privacy in the absence of government regulation? 16 Maybe in the
context of privacy within OSNs, industry self-regulation might fare better
than it has in the context of text-based data aggregation. In the OSN
context, at least as relates to video images, we are not talking about
information that has commercial value when aggregated into large
databases. 317 While textual information from a personal profile on Facebook
might be of interest to online marketers, video information is less likely to
have any significant appeal. Even if it were possible to utilize images to
ascertain whether an image subject might be interested in a certain style of
clothing, for example, the difficulties in processing video information in a
way that easily identifies the subject's details for targeted advertising
purposes likely outweigh any commensurate benefits of doing so, at least on
the basis of today's technology.
Because of these attributes of online video, it is arguable that the
interests of OSN service providers and their users are not disparate in terms
of privacy protection. If OSN service providers obtain more commercial
value by protecting their users' privacy than by failing to do so, there may be
sufficient market incentives for those service providers to compete with each
other in offering privacy protections to their users. Facebook, for example,
offers stronger privacy protections in relation to video files than some of its
competitors.318 However, the fact that it has strongly worded privacy
protections in its terms of use does not necessarily mean that it enforces
them in practice. Additionally, Facebook markets itself as having strong
privacy protections. Nevertheless, it has been criticized for attempts to utilize

315.

Froomkin, supra note 137, at 1524-25 (expressing skepticism about industry self-

regulation in the absence of a serious threat of government regulation); Mark Lemley, Private
Property, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1545, 1554 (2000) ("If we want privacy, we must be willing to accept
the fact that there is no good 'market solution' and endorse some government regulation of the
behavior of data collectors."); Lessig, supra note 166, at 63 ("There is much to be skeptical
about with [a solution to privacy problems involving market regulation]-not the least of which
being that the interests of commerce might well be different from the interests of the
consumer.").

316. Froomkin, supra note 137, at 1524-25 (expressing skepticism about industry selfregulation in the absence of a serious threat of government regulation).
317. Id. at 1469 ("Data accumulation enables the construction of personal data profiles.
When the data are available to others, they can construct personal profiles for targeted
marketing, and even, in rare cases, blackmail."(footnotes omitted)).
318. See supra Part II.B (comparing Facebook's privacy policy to that of other websites
including Yahoo! and YouTube).
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information derived from its users to market items to their online
3 19
"friends."
This evidences a distinct practical problem with over-reliance on
markets as privacy regulators. What an entity says it does and what it actually
does may be two different things. An OSN provider can use promises of
privacy to entice users to accept its services and then can fail to live up to
those promises, even to the extent of engaging in conduct that completely
contradicts its promises.3 20 In a perfect market, consumers would simply
take their business elsewhere. Yet, in online markets there is often no
competitive "elsewhere" to go-the transaction costs of moving all of your
personal information to another OSN are high 32 1 relative to the benefits of
doing so. If you want to interact socially online, you may have little real
choice between service providers.
There are a number of other difficulties with reliance on privacy
policies to protect consumers' interests online. There are problems of
322
inequality of bargaining power between consumers and OSN providers.
Even if a large group of consumers objects to a privacy policy, there are
collective-action problems. It is often difficult for consumers to collectively
express their privacy preferences to OSN providers. 323 Privacy policies tend
to be fairly toothless in practice. These policies are often drafted in vague,
aspirational terms with little serious attempt at making specific
3 24
representations of exactly how a user's privacy will be protected.
Additionally, privacy policies tend to be regularly updated unilaterally by
OSN providers, thus putting an unrealistic obligation on users to routinely
check back on the policy to keep track of the privacy terms.3 25 Market forces
may be a useful and important form of regulation. However, market
incentives are often insufficient to effectively protect users' privacy. 326 This

319. Posting of Megan McCarthy to Epicenter, supra note 141; Posting of William
McGeveran to Info/Law, supra note 315.
320. SOLOvE, supra note 16, at 81-87 (describing failures of contracts and market forces in
protecting privacy).
321. Transaction costs include, for example, the costs of moving relevant information and
perhaps even having to set up a new e-mail account, notifying others of your new e-mail
address, and establishing a new personal profile. See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 28, at 68-69
(discussing difficulties of switching services in this context).
322. SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 82.
323. See id. (discussing the inequalities in bargaining power).
324.
See id. at 83 (describing company privacy policies).
325. See id. (stating that customers generally cannot keep companies from changing privacy
policies).
326. Froomkin, supra note 137, at 1527 ("A more generic problem with self-regulatory
schemes, even those limited to e-commerce or web sites in general, is that they regulate only
those motivated or principled enough to take part in them.").
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may be an area in which it is necessary for legal rules to interact with market
327
forces to facilitate more appropriate outcomes.
D.

SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

System architecture has been defined as "technologies for re-creating
privacy where other technologies may have erased it."328 One salient
example of a privacy-protecting architecture is the Platform for Privacy
Preferences ("P3P") Project, which supports the development of software
code that allows websites and Internet users to set automatic default privacy
preferences on their computers that other computers can read without the
need for human intervention.3 29 For example, if a user sets high privacy
settings, her computer might automatically deny access to certain websites
that do not meet those standards.
Architecture can have a profound impact on privacy. 330 One of its
obvious advantages is that it can be more proactive than many other forms
of regulation.3 3' It creates ex ante constraints that prevent harm, while laws,
for example, provide remedies after harms have occurred.3 32 Nevertheless,
the problem with architecture is that it does not necessarily work well on its
own. Privacy-enhancing technologies can be expensive and there is often
little incentive for OSNs to invest in them absent government regulation
requiring them to do so. While there may be incentives for consumers to
invest in privacy-enhancing technologies, many consumers lack sufficient

327. In the associated context of online data aggregation and privacy concerns, Professor
Froomkin has suggested the need for an approach that combines legislation, market forces, and
social norms. Id. at 1528 ("One way of creating incentives for accurate, if not necessarily ideal,
privacy policies would be to use legislation, market forces, and the litigiousness of Americans to
create a self-policing (as opposed to self-regulating) system for web-based data collection.").
328. Lessig, supra note 166, at 63. For completeness, it should be noted that others have
defined architecture more broadly in this context. Professor Solove, for example, appears to
contemplate that system architecture includes hardware and software as well as the default
attributes of relationships between individuals and those who control or process their
information. SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 97-101.
329. See World Wide Web Consortium, Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project,
http://www.w3.org/P3P/Overview.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) (describing the function of
P3P).

330. See SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 200 ("The technological design of the websites has an
enormous impact on people's privacy."); Froomkin, supra note 137, at 1528-33 (describing
potential for use of privacy-enhancing technologies as a form of system architecture to protect
privacy); Reidenberg, supra note 34, at 562-65 (discussing the impact of network architecture
on security);Joel R. Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging the Trade

and Technical Paradigms,6 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 287, 296-97 (1993) (same).
331. SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 100.
332. Id.; LESSIG, supra note 179, at 122 ("[A]s with the market, architecture effects its
constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts
enforcing contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by 'architecture.'").
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knowledge to work with these technologies. This is where public education
333
plays an important role in the privacy matrix.
Some OSNs already employ privacy-enhancing architectures. A salient
example is the closed-network format utilized by Facebook and MySpace.
These services use technology to limit users to accessing information of
other users that they are authorized to access. 334 There are other examples
where technological solutions may be implemented to better protect onlinevideo privacy. For example, Professors Edwards and Brown have suggested
the possibility of automatic-data-expiration settings to combat the
permanency problem of digital data in the OSN context. 335 Of course,
expiration settings do not automatically deal with the problems of
unauthorized dissemination of images prior to the expiration of the original
post, or of the permanence of any copies made available on other websites.
If images have been tagged, they may be easy to find on multiple websites
even after the original image has expired. In fact, with projects such as the
Internet Archive, many images will continue to be available in some form
336
even after all "live" images have been removed from relevant websites.
Nevertheless, automatic-expiration settings would, to some extent, limit the
availability of some personal information online. If multiple sites adopted
the practice of automatic data expiration, then even copied images would
eventually be removed from multiple sites, thus potentially lessening the
permanency problem.
Technological solutions might also be developed to prevent
unauthorized cutting and pasting of digital video files in the absence of
consent by the image holder and the image subject. Code can be written to

333. See infra Part IV.E (arguing that education is important because it informs the public
about issues of privacy online).
334. On Facebook, there are numerous ways for users to restrict access to profile
information. Facebook, Privacy: Privacy Settings and Fundamentals, http://www.facebook.com/
help/#!/help/?page=419 (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). Facebook also allows users to block
particular people from accessing their profiles. Facebook, Privacy: Blocking People,
http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=419#/help.php?page=841 (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
Facebook describes its blocking policy:
A block prevents specific people from viewing your profile. Any ties you currently
have with the people you block will be broken (friendship connections, friend
details, etc.). Your profile will not be visible to them and you will not appear in
their search results or friend lists. Blocking is mutual, so they will also become
invisible to you as well.
Id.
335. Edwards & Brown, supra note 182, at 225.
336. Using the "Wayback Machine" on the Internet Archive, one can browse through
historical records of eighty-five billion web pages archived since 1996. Internet Archive, The
Wayback Machine, http://www.archive.org/web/web.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
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prohibit cutting and pasting, 337 while at the same time sending a request to
the image holder and image subject for permission to disseminate the
image. The holder and subject could then respond, and that response could
translate into a permission or non-permission to use the image. If the service
did not receive a response from either the image holder or the image
subject, it could simply refuse permission to copy the image. 338 Alternatively,
or additionally, the image could be tagged with permissions when originally
uploaded. This would not prevent unauthorized disseminations of images
per se, but it would bring the privacy preferences of the image subject into
public view. Such an approach may assist in online norm development. In
fact, some OSNs are experimenting with these kinds of tags. Facebook has
offered technology to label photographs in order to indicate what groups of
people are authorized to view them. 339 However, this system is limited in that
the tags are lost when an image is copied outside the Facebook network. 34°
To fully protect privacy, image subjects, as well as owners of online images,
would have to utilize tags. This could piove unwieldy in practice.
This is obviously not a comprehensive survey of technological solutions
to video-privacy problems. It is merely intended to establish the availability
of technological options that have not yet been seriously investigated and
that might better protect online privacy. Many technologies that would
enable enhanced privacy protection for video images are in existence today
and have yet to be implemented in this context. The failure to apply them
likely has to do with a combination of factors, including: (1) assumptions by
some online service providers that users do not care sufficiently about
privacy to make it worth their while to employ these technologies; 341 (2)

337.
Online entities have been using copy-control technologies online in the copyright
context extensively in recent years. See LESSIG, supra note 179, at 147-53 (providing a discussion
of copy-control technologies employed by Adobe with respect to the sale of eBooks).
338.

This would not be dissimilar to the Creative Commons license utilized to express

copyright holders' preferences as to permitted uses of a given copyright work. Creative
Commons, Creative Commons Licenses, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/meetthe-licenses (last visited Feb. 18, 2010); see also ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 225. Zittrain stated:
As people put data on the Internet for others to use or reuse-data that might be
about other people as well as themselves-there are no tools to allow those who
provide the data to express their preferences about how the data ought to be
indexed or used. There is no Privacy Commons license to request basic limits on
how one's photographs ought to be reproduced from a social networking site.
There ought to be.
Id.
339. ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 226 ("Facebook... offers tools to label the photographs one
submits and to indicate what groups of people can and cannot see them. Once a photo is
copied beyond the Facebook environment, however, these attributes are lost.").
340. Id.
341. SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 82 ("Companies only rarely compete on the basis of the
amount of privacy they offer. People often do not weigh privacy policies heavily when choosing

companies.").
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users' lack of awareness of these technologies; (3) a lack of financial
incentives for online service providers to develop and deploy these
technologies; 342 and (4) a lack of clarity about social norms regarding online
privacy, particularly in the video and multimedia context. Some of the more
obvious advantages of developing technological solutions to emerging
privacy problems are their effectiveness and their global reach.3 43 For
example, if OSNs such as Facebook wanted to better protect privacy on a
global scale, it would be a simple matter for them to create technological
privacy defaults that would automatically operate in all countries where their
services were accessible.
E.

EDUCATION

In recent years, commentators have begun focusing on new modes of
regulation that may be equally important for online privacy as the four
344
regulatory modalities discussed above. One example is public education.
In the context of online privacy, we should consider who has the
responsibility to educate the public and how prescriptive or otherwise such
education may be.3 45 If, for example, social norms really are yet to develop
in many online contexts, then education, at least at this point in time, might
best be aimed at generating a public dialogue on privacy rather than on

342. Froomkin, supra note 137, at 1524 ("Since the economic incentive to provide strong
privacy protections is either weak, nonexistent, or at least nonuniformly distributed among all
participants in the marketplace, most serious proposals for self-regulation among market
participants rely on the threat of government regulation ....").
343. LESSIG, supra note 179, at 147-53 (discussing effectiveness of copy-control technologies
in the eBook-copyright context).
See also SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 204. Solove stated,

344.

Education is the most viable way to shape people's choices in [regard to
information disclosed online]. For example, one study indicated that people have
a lot of misunderstandings about who is able to search their Facebook profiles....
We need to spend a lot more time educating people about the consequences of
posting information online.
Id.; see alsoEdwards & Brown, supra note 182, at 220 ("[MIore effort seems to have gone towards
advising users how to act wisely on [social-networking sites] (an educational perspective), rather
than in persuading [social-networking sites] to adopt clear, consistent, and non-oppressive
terms in both their written documents and ... their code."). Others have noted the importance
of public education as a regulatory force in society as a means of educating people about
privacy interests. See, e.g., Abril & Cava, supra note 18, at 271-72 (suggesting that sometimes
even the mere mention of privacy on a web service raises users' caution levels); Bernstein, supra
note 128, at 264 (talking about the role of genetic counselors in educating the public about
privacy rights with respect to genetic testing and dissemination of personal information from
genetic testing); Froomkin, supra note 137, at 1506 ("Legal rules prohibiting data collection in
public are not the only possible response; defenses against collection might also include
educating people as to the consequences of disclosure or deploying countertechnologies such
as scramblers, detectors, or masks.").
345.
Abril, supra note 49, at 87 (suggesting that Internet service providers have a role as
public educators with respect to online privacy).
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instructing the public about privacy. On the other hand, the public should
certainly be instructed about currently available privacy-enhancing
technologies so that these technologies might be used more effectively in
practice.
Public education is currently an important, if under-utilized, regulatory
modality for online privacy, both in the video context and with respect to
unauthorized uses and disseminations of personal information more
generally. Even if the education component consists only of explanations
about the increasing loss of control people have over their personal
information online, this might inform the development of social norms. It
might facilitate a situation where Internet users are more cautious about
what information they disclose online, both about themselves and about
their friends and acquaintances. The final regulatory modality addressed
here-private or nonprofit institutions-potentially interacts usefully with
public education in that many of these institutions can serve an important
public-education role.
F.

INSTITUTIONS

Another mode of regulating privacy revolves around the recognition of
institutions as privacy regulators. 346 In a recent article on the importance of
"intellectual privacy," Professor Neil Richards utilized the example of
libraries and, in particular, the American Library Association ("ALA") in
promoting free speech and intellectual liberty against the threat of
government surveillance. 347 He discusses the ALA's 1939 Library Bill of
Rights which declared aspirations of intellectual freedom and privacy for
library patrons. 348 Others have recognized the importance of institutions as
regulators in various online contexts. Professor Lessig, for example, has
emphasized the work of nonprofit institutions as a potential regulatory
modality in the digital copyright context. He cites the examples of the Public
Library of Science ("PLoS") 349 and the Creative Commons3 50 as nonprofit
organizations whose work aims to facilitate more effective use of copyrighted
351
works for the benefit of society as a whole.

346. Richards, supra note 36, at 419.
347. Id. at 420-21.
348. Id. Of course, one might suggest that the idea of "institutions as regulators" is really a
subset of market forces as a regulatory modality. However, there are subtle differences. Market
forces are determined largely by commercial interests. Institutional interests, however, may be
more aspirational and focused on the needs of bettering society generally.
349. LEssic, supra note 179, at 281-82.
350. Id. at 282-86.
351. The PLoS is a nonprofit organization that maintains a repository of scientific work in
electronic form that is "made permanently available for free." Id. at 281-82. The Creative
Commons is a nonprofit corporation that assists copyright holders in granting more flexible
permissions for uses of their works. Id. at 282. Creative Commons' goal:
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Institutions can also serve an important role in advocating on behalf of
law reform. Some institutions might investigate social norms on issues like
privacy and advocate for legislation that better reflects those norms.
Additionally, some institutions such as the EFF3 52 routinely file amicus briefs
in judicial proceedings,3 53 thus playing into the judicial side of the
regulatory equation. The question for video privacy in the OSN context
(and online privacy generally) is whether there are currently any institutions
that could appropriately fulfill an institutional regulatory function. Because
most of the players in the OSN privacy matrix are commercial enterprises
and private Internet users, it is difficult to identify an analog to the ALA, the
PLoS, or Creative Commons in the privacy context. The closest obvious
contenders are some public-interest organizations that aim to protect rights
and freedoms online, such as the EFF and the EPIC. 354 Other similar

organizations may be developed specifically to take on an institutional role
in protecting privacy online.

[I]s to build a layer of reasonablecopyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It
does this by making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by
making it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and build
upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
Id. Creative Commons describes its mission as follows:
Creative Commons is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making it easier for
people to share and build upon the work of others, consistent with the rules of
copyright.
We provide free licenses and other legal tools to mark creative work with the
freedom the creator wants it to carry, so others can share, remix, use commercially,
or any combination thereof.
Creative Commons, About, http://www.creativecommons.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 18,
2010).
352. GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 31, at 18 (describing the EFF as an organization
founded to use tools of "political participation, litigation, education, seminars, and campaigns"
to develop a legal conception of cyberspace that would defend it from intrusions by territorial
governments).
353. For examples, see Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, ACLU of
Ohio Foundation, Inc., American Civil Liberties Union, and Center for Democracy and
Technology Supporting the Appellee and Urging Affirmance, Warshak v. United States, 532
F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-4092), 2006 WL 4670945; Brief Amici Curiae of Electronic
Fronter [sic] Foundation, Public Knowledge, United States Internet Industry Association, and
Computer & Communications Industry Association in Support of Defendant Jammie Thomas,
Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (Civ. No. 06-1497
(MJD/RLE)), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/capitolv-thomas/20080620EFF
AmiciBrief.pdf.
354. The Electronic Privacy Information Center describes itself as "a public interest
research center in Washington, D.C. ... established in 1994 to focus public attention on
emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional
values." Electronic Privacy Information Center supa note 185.
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355
These kinds of organizations tend not to be particularly well funded,
at least as compared with corporate interests. They certainly do important
work in advocating for the rights of Internet users who may not be able to
protect their own individual interests online because of collective-action
problems or lack of knowledge about relevant law and technology. Perhaps
part of the regulatory equation for protecting privacy online should include
encouraging funding for organizations such as the EFF and EPIC. At the
very least, these kinds of institutions can play an important regulatory role,
particularly as public educator and advocate,3 56 in protecting online privacy.
Academic institutions are another set of nonprofit organizations that
can play a public-education role. 357 They can assist in developing statements
of best practices about online privacy, as well as disseminating information
to the public about these issues. This is already done through conferences
and symposia. 358 A greater array of publications and greater accessibility to
conferences and conference proceedings, including free online
availability, 359 could improve the ongoing privacy matrix. Clearly public
education and institutions as regulatory modalities have significant synergies
and could more usefully employ themselves in the future development of
online-privacy principles, alongside the other regulatory modalities.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Privacy has become the object of considerable concern. The purely fortuitous
intrusions inherent in a compact and interrelated society have multiplied.
The more insidious intrusionsof increasingly sophisticatedscientific devices
into previously untouched areas, and the burgeoning claims of public and
private agencies to personal information, have created a new sense of
urgency in defense of privacy.
-Professor

Charles Fried

36°

As evidenced by Professor Fried's comments from the late 1960s,
privacy rights have been of significant concern since long before the
Internet generation. However, the exponential rise of online privacy-

355.
Much of the EFF's funding relies on volunteer work and donations. Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Volunteer, http://www.eff.org/about/opportunities/volunteer
(last

visited Feb. 18, 2010). EPIC relies on contributions from individual and private institutions and
legal awards. ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., ENSURING ACCURACY & PRIVACY: EPIC 2005-2006
ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2005), availabe at http://epic.org/epic/annualreports/2005.pdf.

356. GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 31, at 18-19.
357. ZITrRAIN, supra note 2, at 244-45 (suggesting that universities take on a stronger
leadership role in the Internet's future development more generally).
358. See, e.g., The Computers Freedom & Privacy Conference, http://www.cfp.org/ (last
visited Feb. 18, 2010) (listing various CFP conferences).
359. For example, academic institutions can facilitate public education through podcasting.
360. Fried, supra note 142, at 475.
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destroying technologies 361 has led to increasing concerns about individual
privacy in recent years. The scope and scale of online privacy violations can
be truly devastating, as evidenced by the fate of dog-poop girl, Star Wars kid,
and Bus Uncle. This Article has identified a number of regulatory avenues
that can better protect digital privacy. However, the pace of technological
change raises significant challenges for successful regulation. It is now time
to start thinking more urgently about creating a workable matrix of
regulatory approaches that better protects online privacy, particularly with
respect to video and multimedia files disseminated online.
Some would argue that privacy concerns are a "blip" phenomenon and
that time will educate Internet users to be more careful about video images
and other information they place online or allow to be placed online about
them.3 62 However, these views are problematic for a number of reasons. For
one thing, even if current Internet users' apparent carelessness about
personal information online is temporary, the effects of this carelessness
may be widespread, permanent, and devastating because of the global 363 and
increasingly archival nature of today's online content. 364 Coupled with the
aggregation and decontextualization problems identified in Part II, the
"blip" of unfortunate behavior today may have serious long-term
consequences for many people. In addition, there is evidence that " [ p] eople
are time-inconsistent" in relation to privacy in particular.3 65 Thus, it is
possible that each new generation may be more careless about privacy in
their younger years and later live to regret that carelessness.
The Internet fundamentally challenges our perspectives on social,
political, and economic behaviors every decade or so. Each shift requires
decision-makers to rethink basic assumptions about human interaction
within progressively shorter timeframes. User-generated content on OSNs is

361.

Froomkin, supra note 137, at 1468-501 (providing a detailed survey of modern privacy-

destroying technologies).
362. Edwards & Brown, supranote 182, at 227.
363. PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 28, at 80 (noting that solutions to cyberspace-privacy
problems will ultimately have to be global).
364.

CLAY SHIRKY, HERE

COMEs EvERYBODY:

THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT

ORGANIZATIONS 237 (2008) ("An interesting effect of digital archiving is that much casual
conversation is now captured and stored for posterity, so it is possible to look back in time and
find simple messages whose importance becomes obvious only with the passage of time.").
365. Grimmelmann, supra note 107, at 1179:
People are time-inconsistent; they care more about privacy as they age. Teens in
particular are notorious risk-takers; they do dangerous things, like smoke and drive
recklessly, that they later regret, even when given accurate information about the
risks. Even if people in general develop more accurate expectations about how
social network sites work and the privacy risks involved, hundreds of thousands of
children come online each year: people who by definition don't have much
experience in what to expect in terms of online privacy.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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a new crunch point in this online evolution, particularly with regards to
privacy. This Article has demonstrated that serious privacy harms can result
from unbridled dissemination of video files online. It suggests that it is time
to consider a new multimodal regulatory approach to protect individual
privacy. If we do not act now, privacy-destroying norms may become
entrenched, making it much more difficult to protect privacy in the future.
Even overzealous action now can be reined in later if it is subsequently
determined to be overprotective of privacy to the detriment of other
important interests such as free speech. There is little downside to
considering and employing regulatory action for the purpose of protecting
privacy. Regulation, imperfect as it may be, can be revised later, but today's
video-privacy incursions may have far-reaching and potentially devastating
3 66
consequences that cannot meaningfully be undone tomorrow.

366. Id. at 1181 ("[Elither society will significantly adjust its privacy norms or a lot of
people are going to have some lifelong regrets about their youthful Internet indiscretions.").

